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A social model of disability relates a person’s disadvantage to the
combination of personal traits and social setting. The model appears to
have had a profound impact on academics, politics, and law since the
1970s. Scholars have debated the model’s force but its limitations are
more severe than have been recognized. This Article claims that the
model, like all social construction accounts, has essentially no policy
implications. Its impact depends on normative commitments developed by
some other logic, such as membership in the disability rights movement or
adherence to versions of libertarian, utilitarian, or egalitarian theory that
are triggered by the model’s causation story. At the same time, a
normative framework within which the social model is relevant will
suggest not only policy goals but also an institutional design. These points
are illustrated by recent controversies involving genetic screening
technology, cochlear implants, and sign language communities. Contrary
to impressions left in the law literature, the social model has nothing to
say about the proper response to such developments, although the model
might have a mediated influence on our sense of the best decisionmakers.
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INTRODUCTION
For many advocates and academics, a social model of disability is foundational. It
defines their field of study and it counsels everyone to see “disability” as disadvantage
caused by the confluence of two factors: (1) a person’s physical or mental traits plus (2)
the surrounding environment, which is at least partly constructed by others. Both factors
might be necessary before disadvantage takes hold. Although once obscure, the model is
now standard learning in disability studies. Its causation story has been a message of the
disability rights movement since the 1970s,1 and in 1990 the model was successfully
launched in Western academia by Michael Oliver’s The Politics of Disablement: A
Sociological Approach.2
The simplicity of the social model helps account for its jarring effect on any
conventional wisdom that portrays disability as a personal tragedy. Indeed the model has
been credited with inspiring change in many forms. Parts of the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA) indicate that social settings must be revised to make individual
traits less disabling. Reasonable accommodation for employees is an example,3 as is the
qualified duty to make certain places accessible to mobility-impaired people.4 A federal
district court recently used similar principles to hold that U.S. paper currency violates the
Rehabilitation Act.5 The complaint is that our denominations, unlike many foreign bills
which vary in size and texture, are not readily distinguishable to blind people.6 In the
same basic spirit, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Convention on the
Rights of Persons with Disabilities in December 2006. The Convention stresses the
“importance of accessibility to the physical, social, economic and cultural environment

1

See Union of the Physically Impaired against Segregation (“UPIAS”), Fundamental Principles of
Disability 13 (1976), online at
http://www.leeds.ac.uk/disability-studies/archiveuk/UPIAS/fundamental%20principles.pdf (visited April 1,
2007).
2
Michael Oliver, The Politics of Disablement: A Sociological Approach 11 (St Martin’s 1990); see also
Tom Shakespeare, Introduction, in The Disabilities Reader: Social Science Perspectives 1, 1 (1998)
(crediting Oliver).
3
See The Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 USC §§ 12111(9), 12112(a), (b)(5)(A) (2000).
4
See id §§ 12182(a), (b)(2)(A)(iv), 12183(a).
5
29 USC § 794 (2000).
6
See American Council of Blind v Paulson, 463 F Supp 2d 51, 62–63 (DDC 2006) (granting declaratory
relief and certifying the question for interlocutory appeal). It is unclear whether plaintiffs will settle for
expedited development of new portable electronic bill-reading devices.
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. . . in enabling persons with disabilities to fully enjoy all human rights and fundamental
freedoms.”7 Academics have indicated that the social model is a normative basis for such
measures.8
Despite the apparent connection between the social model and social change,
there just is no necessary relationship there. That is the central claim of this Article.
Although the social model is one way to define disability and a field of inquiry, it is not a
disability policy. Deciding how to respond to “disability” in law and culture depends on a
normative framework that cannot be supplied by the model. This framework might be
libertarian, utilitarian, egalitarian, some combination thereof, or something else. The
social model itself, however, has essentially nothing to say about which framework to
use. One can accept the model’s insight regarding causes of disadvantage without
committing to a particular response, even if one believes that disability is simply or
importantly the result of people’s attitudes.9 While legal scholars may concede that the
social model does not account for all disadvantage associated with impairments, none
seem to acknowledge the logical distance between the model’s causation description and
public policy.10
The implications are several. First, disability law scholars should stop moving so
quickly from assertions about social construction to arguments for social reconstruction.
Even if their comparative advantage in scholarship does not include moral theory, their

7

Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities preamble ¶ v (2006), online at
http://www.un.org/disabilities/convention/conventionfull.shtml (visited April 1, 2007); see also id at art 9 ¶
1 (“Parties shall take appropriate measures to ensure to persons with disabilities access, on an equal basis
with others, to the physical environment, to transportation, to information and communications . . . and to
other facilities and services open or provided to the public . . . .”); World Health Organization, International
Classification of Functioning, Disability and Health 10–11, 18–20 (2001) (incorporating elements of the
social model into a general classification of health states).
8
See, for example, Mary Crossley, The Disability Kaleidoscope, 74 Notre Dame L Rev 621, 649, 658
(1999); Anita Silvers, Formal Justice, in Anita Silvers et al, eds, Disability, Difference, Discrimination:
Perspectives on Justice in Bioethics and Public Policy 13, 75 (Rowman and Littlefield 1998); Michael
Ashley Stein, Disability Human Rights, 95 Cal L Rev 75, 88-91 (2007).
9
See, for example, Samuel R. Bagenstos, Subordination, Stigma, and “Disability”, 86 Va L Rev 397,
436–48 (2000) (concentrating on stigma); 29 CFR § 1630.2 (2006) (defining “regarded as” disabled for
ADA purposes). An affiliated concept is the “civil rights model” of disability, distinguished below in Part
I.C.
10
See Part I.C. Outside the law literature, consider David Wasserman, Philosophical Issues in the
Definition and Social Response to Disability, in Gary L. Albrecht, ed, Handbook of Disability Studies 219,
222, 229 (Sage 2001). Wasserman’s point is discussed below in text accompanying notes 91–93.
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analytical skills often become unhinged without a defensible normative goal. There is no
way to set priorities, make unavoidable tradeoffs, or confront cost issues without a
normative orientation; even legal formalists must admit this. Second, because of the gap
between causation and policy, the stakes are lower for recognizing social forces in human
disadvantage. Accepting a degree of social construction is not the end of a policy
discussion and so it should be neither shocking nor frightening. It might be intellectually
liberating. Third, the argument applies to all social construction observations, including
those related to gender, race, sexual orientation, class, deviance, and law itself. For all of
them, causation is separable from policy prescription. In fact the argument applies to all
causation observations. None determine just outcomes. This is not to dismiss efforts to
untangle causal forces in human affairs. The social model of disability, for its part, has
been a source of revelation and inspiration for action. It can dispel uncritical assumptions
that disadvantage is natural and necessary, which is no small feat. But we ought to know
precisely what the model can and cannot accomplish.11 Then more can be done. We
might achieve a sophisticated picture of the model’s interaction with general normative
frameworks, without relying on membership in the disability rights movement to do the
work of argument.
There is another oversight in the scholarship but this weakness underestimates the
social model’s implications. When the model is doing work within a normative
framework, its insight can suggest a class of decisionmakers different from the class other
perspectives suggest. This insight might require expertise in addition to or other than
medical knowledge. In a way, disability rights advocates who constructed the social
model were pointing toward this conclusion all along. Yet the connection between the
model and institutional design, however mediated, has not been recognized in the law
literature.
Part I of this Article describes the social model of disability and some of its
weaknesses. The model identifies a subset of all disadvantage related to physical or
mental traits. Critics believe that this subset is small or that the model neglects
11

There is a connection here to the legal realists, who broke down the notion that prevailing forms of
property and contract law were the natural order—but who were then willing to announce that the merits
were open for debate. See below text accompanying notes 103–104.
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connections between “impairment” and “disability”; in addition, social modelers do not
always spell out the type of disadvantage relevant to them. The model is, nevertheless, a
source of truth. The next question is whether acceptance of the social model’s validity is
also a commitment to policy. To help answer, Part II presents recent developments
surrounding Deaf culture: the emergence of preimplantation genetic screening, the
increase in cochlear implant use, and the organization of sign language communities.12
These developments illustrate possible reactions to a disabling social context, but the
social model provides no guidance on the proper response.
Part III further defends this claim and investigates how general normative
frameworks might connect to the model. It is true that affinity for the social model is
correlated with policy preferences among disability rights advocates. Indeed their
movement specified the model alongside a political platform. Also, normative
frameworks can be sensitive to the model’s causation account. Three are reviewed here:
libertarianism and the possibility of corrective justice, utilitarianism with a dose of
hedonic adaptation, and egalitarianism in its antisubordination and human capabilities
versions. Important work on disability has been done within egalitarianism, which is
natural considering the connection to race and gender studies.13 But the fit with the social
model is actually not flush, and the model’s relationship to utilitarianism and
libertarianism is unexplored. The latter two frameworks might be equally or more
sensitive to the social model’s causation story. In any case, affiliation with the social
movement or the normative school motivates the policy response, not the model itself.
Yet when the model is relevant for an independent reason, its insight can prompt a
change in the mix of decisionmakers. The discussion ends on this brief institutional point.

12

See Part II.A.-B. The capitalized term “Deaf” refers to a cultural movement; “deaf” refers to an
individual trait.
13
See note 119 (collecting sources); Part III.B.
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I. SOCIAL MODEL BASICS
No restatement of the social model can satisfy everyone. It has no natural form
independent of its application and the volume of writing on the model is almost
staggering. This variety of versions yields complications. For some observers, all or
nearly all disadvantage suffered by people with disabilities is attributable to their
environment. For others, the causal picture is not so tilted. Moreover, those who use the
label “social model” might embed implicit normative premises within the term, and they
might believe a disabling environment is more easily or justifiably revised once it is
recognized as contingent. Hence isolating the model’s insight about causes of
disadvantage will seem artificial to some. After all, the social model was generated
within a disability rights movement with policy objectives. These problems are taken up
later. But it is useful to describe the model in simple terms before adding complications,
and this can be done while remaining faithful to influential restatements in contemporary
scholarship.
A.

The Causation Account
What is at stake here is the issue of causation . . . .14
A field of study requires some agreement as to its subject matter, and disability is

no exception. The social model is a proposed definition of disability that is connected to
human disadvantage. Stripped down to basics, the model moves causal responsibility for
disadvantage from physically and mentally impaired individuals to their architectural,
social, and economic environment. Not necessarily moral responsibility, although that
might follow, but causal responsibility. Either way, the model is powerful within its
domain. This is especially true when conventional wisdom attributes a disabled life to
personal tragedy, or curse, or sin, or some other fairly individualized phenomenon. The
social model redirects attention to the environment surrounding an impaired individual.15

14

Oliver, The Politics of Disablement at 11 (cited in note 2).
Recent restatements of the social model in disabilities legal scholarship include Bagenstos, 86 Va L
Rev at 426–30 (cited in note 9); Carlos A. Ball, Looking for Theory in All the Rights Places: Feminist and
Communitarian Elements of Disability Discrimination Law, 66 Ohio St L J 105, 130–31 (2005); Mary
Crossley, Reasonable Accommodation as Part and Parcel of the Antidiscrimination Project, 35 Rutgers L J
861, 875–77 (2004); Michael Ashley Stein, Same Struggle, Different Difference: ADA Accommodations
as Antidiscrimination, 153 U Pa L Rev 579, 599 (2004). A forerunner is Jacobus tenBroek, The Right to
15
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Disability scholars contrast the social model with an “individual” or “medical”
model of disability. This model focuses on the disadvantaging impact of physical or
mental impairments rather than that of the environment in which they operate. The
impairments themselves are thought to be disabling.16 If any assistance is appropriate,
therefore, it would presumably be the delivery of individualized services—hearing aids,
wheelchairs, guide dogs, personal care attendants, pharmaceuticals, and the like.17
Descriptions of the medical model often include a subordination theme as well. Inspired
by Talcott Parsons’ notion of the “sick role” in Western society,18 critics of the medical
model associate it with belittling norms that relieve impaired persons from social
obligations yet demand they abide by professional medical judgment. Both responsibility
and liberty are thereby reduced.19 But it is difficult to find scholars who promote any such
“model” of disability. Parsons was interested in describing social equilibria, and
disability studies scholars hold out the medical model as error. It is their perception of
how traditional health and welfare systems (mis)understand disability.20

Live in the World: The Disabled in the Law of Torts, 54 Cal L Rev 841, 842 (1966) (noting the role of
public attitudes in the causation story of the social model).
Salient non-legal descriptions include Oliver, The Politics of Disablement at 11 (cited in note 2) (adopting
the UPIAS definition of “disability”); Susan Wendell, The Rejected Body: Feminist Philosophical
Reflections on Disability 23, 35–45 (Routledge 1996); Colin Barnes, The Social Model of Disability: A
Sociological Phenomenon Ignored by Sociologists?, in Tom Shakespeare, ed, The Disabilities Reader XX,
65 (cited in note 2); Silvers, Formal Justice at 74–76 (cited in note 8). See also Martha Minow, Making All
the Difference: Inclusion, Exclusion, and American Law 12, 85, 110–14 (Cornell 1990) (discussing a social
relations perspective on human difference); Ron Amundson, Disability, Handicap, and the Environment, 23
J Soc Phil 105, 109–10 (1992) (adding the importance of “a particular goal”).
16
See Claire H. Liachowitz, Disability as a Social Construct: Legislative Roots 12 (UPenn 1988);
Michael Oliver, Understanding Disability: From Theory to Practice 31–32 (1996).
17
Theodore P. Seto and Sande Buhai, Tax and Disability: Ability to Pay and the Taxation of Difference,
154 U Pa L Rev 1053, 1059–62 (2006) (discussing social security as a program based on the
“medical/charity paradigm”).
18
See Talcott Parsons, The Social System 429–79 (1951) (introducing the “sick role” as an institutional
role “necessary to enable the physician to bring his competence to bear on the situation”); Talcott Parsons,
The Sick Role and the Role of the Physician Reconsidered, 53 Health & Society 257, 261–62, 266–77
(1975) (suggesting the power inequality of the typical doctor/patient relationship).
19
See David Pfeiffer, The Conceptualization of Disability, in Sharon N. Barnartt and Barbara M. Altman,
eds, 2 Research in Social Science and Disability: Exploring Theories and Expanding Methodologies 29,
30–31 (2001); Mark Priestley, Constructions and Creations: Idealism, Materialism and Disability Theory,
13 Disability & Society 75, 82–83 (1998); see also Sharon Barnartt, Using Role Theory to Describe
Disability, in 2 Research in Social Science and Disability at 58–68 (cited in note 19) (discussing disability
as a master status); Gerben DeJong, The Movement for Independent Living: Origins, Ideology and
Implications for Disability Research, in A. Brechin et al, eds, Handicap in a Social World 239, 442–47
(Hodder and Stoughton 1981) (describing “the impaired role” of permanent dependency).
20
See, for example, Gary L. Albrecht, The Disability Business: Rehabilitation in America 67–68 (Sage
Draft of April 22, 2007
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FIGURE 1: A MEDICAL MODEL OF DISABILITY
individual’s physical or
mental trait (e.g., a gene
associated with deafness)

individual’s functional
impairment
(e.g., inability to hear)

individual’s disadvantage
(e.g., economic, social,
political status)

Key to the social model is a distinction between personal impairments and
disability.21 Akin to the sex/gender distinction of the 1970s, the social model indicates
that at least some impairments disadvantage only because of their interaction with a
social setting.22 Thus the model defines “disability” as disadvantage caused by the
confluence of (1) personal impairment and (2) a social setting comprising architecture,
economics, politics, culture, social norms, aesthetic values, and assumptions about
ability. Different scholars stress different social factors: some American disability
scholars have emphasized stigma and role theory, while some British writers concentrate
on the mode of production.23 But their messages are similar.24 Because social settings
change over time and space, disability is not an entailment of impairment but at least

1992) (criticizing the influence of the medical model on the rehabilitation industry); Pfeiffer, The
Conceptualization of Disability at 31 (cited in note 19); Stein, 95 Cal L Rev at 18 (manuscript) (cited in
note 8).
21
See, for example, Oliver, Understanding Disability at 32–33 (cited in note 16); Oliver, The Politics of
Disablement at 10–11 (cited in note 2) (separately defining impairment and disability); Silvers, Formal
Justice at 53–56 (cited in note 8) (tracing the development of the conflation of disability and impairment in
Western society); see also Liachowitz, Disability as a Social Construct at ch 1 (cited in note 16).
22
Compare Ann Oakley, Sex, Gender, and Society 204 (Harper & Rowe 1972) (comparing gender to
socially constructed caste). Another strain of thought in disability studies emphasizes that some
impairments are caused by social systems, like employment and war. See Paul Abberley, The Concept of
Oppression and the Development of a Social Theory of Disability, 2 Disability, Handicap & Socy 5, 9–13
(1987). I set aside that strain, which is in turn different from the claim that traits become “impairments”
only after social construction. See Part I.B.
23
See Pfeiffer, The Conceptualization of Disability at 32–34 (cited in note 19).
24
See Priestley, Constructions and Creations at 76–82, 89–90 (cited in note 19) (outlining four
approaches among British and American scholars with an “individual-social dimension and [a] materialistidealist dimension”).
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sometimes an artifact of environment.25 Because these settings are generated in part by
the choices of others, causal responsibility for a person’s disadvantage cannot be
attributed solely to that person’s impairment.
FIGURE 2: A SOCIAL MODEL OF DISABILITY

social norms, beliefs, and
mainstream preferences
(e.g., oral communication)

individual’s physical or
mental trait (e.g., a gene
associated with deafness)

built environment choices
(e.g., telephone networks)

individual’s functional
impairment
(e.g., inability to hear)

individual’s disadvantage
(e.g., economic, social,
political status)

The concept is almost invariably illustrated with architectural barriers faced by
wheelchair users.26 It is one thing to be unable to walk. It is quite another matter to be
unable to enter a building unassisted because the architect preferred stairs to ramps.
Walkers might find stairs aesthetically pleasing, and new technology may enable stairclimbing by non-walkers.27 But for most wheelchair users today, stairs are no different

25

On cultural contingency, see Colin Barnes, Theories of Disability and the Origins of the Oppression of
Disabled People in Western Society, in Len Barton, ed, Disability and Society: Emerging Issues and
Insights 43 (Longman 1996); Martha L. Edwards, Deaf and Dumb in Ancient Greece, in Lennard J. Davis,
ed, The Disability Studies Reader 29, 29, 35–36 (Routledge 1997) (suggesting that Ancient Greek elites
connected deafness to intellectual impairment because the latter was connected to linguistic inability); Ida
Nicolaisen, Persons and Nonpersons: Disability and Personhood Among the Punah Bah of Central Borneo,
in Benedicte Ingstad and Susan Reynolds Whyte, eds, Disability and Culture 38, 44–46 (University of
California 1995) (explaining that the Punan Bah “do not hold the physically and mentally impaired
responsible for their condition” because they view these impairments as imperfections in the soul of the
body part afflicted, and not the soul of the body itself); Aud Talle, A Child Is a Child: Disability and
Equality Among the Kenya Maasai, in id at 56, 56–69 (finding no disfavored category of “disabled” among
the Maasai, although certain impairments and deformity are associated with divine punishment or curse).
26
See, for example, Minow, Making all the Difference at 12 (cited in note 15); Crossley, 75 Notre Dame
L Rev at 654 (cited in note 8).
27
See Yudhijit Bhattacharjee, Users Discover Pros and Cons in Stair-Climbing Wheelchair, NY Times F7
(Aug 19, 2003) (reporting on the iBOT machine). A video of the device is available at
http://www.ibotnow.com/_media/video/ibot4WheelVideo.htm?Function=STAIR (visited April 1, 2007).
Whether stairs are cheaper than ramps in a particular setting is another matter. Here the discussion is about
the causes of disability.
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from walls while most walkers are perfectly able to traverse both stairs and ramps.
Attributing “the” cause of such access problems solely to wheelchair users is arbitrary.
Equally poignant examples involve nonphysical barriers. What counts as a bodily
deformity worthy of disgust is a matter of taste and social convention. Whether mild
intellectual impairments are economically disadvantageous depends on the mix of
employment opportunities (for example, simple as opposed to complex). Whether a blind,
mute, or deaf person is at a disadvantage when disseminating ideas turns on the dominant
method of communication in the relevant context (for example, spoken word as opposed
to written English as opposed to Braille as opposed to sign language). It even has become
contentious to use the word “impairment” and its connotation of inferiority. “Trait” better
fits the social model’s broadest implications.28
Consider early Martha’s Vineyard, Massachusetts. As documented by Nora Ellen
Groce, an atypically large percentage of deaf people lived on the island from the late
1700s until 1952. The number of deaf inhabitants was nothing like a majority: seventytwo over the entire time period.29 Yet Groce’s sources indicate that many or most hearing
inhabitants became bilingual in spoken English and a form of sign language.30 The
prevalence of sign language seems related to at least three factors. First, many families
had at least one deaf member. Second, and perhaps as a consequence, deaf people were
socially and economically integrated into the larger island community.31 Third, hearing
islanders understood that sign languages have functional advantages. Signing facilitates
communication in loud settings like the open seas, and it permits private conversations
near third parties who lack sight lines to the signs. Groce’s reconstruction of Vineyard
life shows the absence of a conventional division between groups, given the right social
conditions.

28

See, for example, Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Future of Disability Law, 114 Yale L J 1, 12 (2004) (using
the phrase “physical or mental traits” in explaining disability advocates’ arguments).
29
See Nora Ellen Groce, Everyone Here Spoke Sign Language: Hereditary Deafness on Martha’s
Vineyard 3 (Harvard 1985) (explaining that this number amounts to one in every 155 people born deaf on
Martha’s Vineyard in the nineteenth century, as opposed to one in every 5,728 born in America during the
same period).
30
See id at 3, 53, 93.
31
See id at 4–5, 77–94, 106–09 (discussing the integration of deaf islanders into education, marriage,
family, economic and civic life). No deaf islanders were alive when Groce conducted her interviews. She
relied on the memory of hearing islanders and documentary sources.
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However attractive the basic thought, a social model can be used to make vastly
different claims about causation. One area for disagreement is the relative importance of
causal forces within the category of social setting. As noted, some scholars concentrate
on one class of social forces over others. Equally significant, a social model allows for
different claims about the importance of all environmental factors put together.32 Model
users are not locked into claiming that social setting overwhelms individual impairment
in causing disadvantage.
At the micro scale, one can attempt to evaluate the strength of any particular
causal relationship between social setting and disadvantage. Many forces may be at work
in disadvantage and they will shift over time; they will depend on individual goals as well
as capacities. Moreover, one must select a metric for the importance of these forces along
with a way to assess the relevance of omissions. But some answers will be uncontested.
In fact, the strongest possible causal relationship between social setting and disadvantage
is foreclosed. By definition the model targets a combination of environmental and
individual traits.33 It thereby rules out or does not capture the possibility that a social
setting alone is the sufficient cause of disadvantage.
Other varieties of causation likewise flush out claims that might be made. Tort
law’s distinction between but-for and proximate cause is useful here. In one set of
situations, the environment will be a necessary cause of disadvantage. The social model
is designed to reach these cases, where an individual trait cannot disadvantage on its own.
Physical deformity is an example: at least some atypical body features are inhibiting only
because other people treat them as aesthetically repulsive or a sign of undesirable traits.
In other situations, the environment might be a substantial factor in producing an
individual’s disadvantage even if it is not a necessary cause. It is possible to view certain
32

See Wasserman, Philosophical Issues at 225–28 (cited in note 10) (recognizing the variety of factors
and distinguishing between causes and conditions of disability).
33
See Shelley Tremain, On the Government of Disability, 27 Soc Theory & Prac 617, 630 (2001)
(asserting the “unstated premise” of the disability movement in the UK is that although impairment is not a
sufficient condition for disadvantage it is a necessary one). A person might be erroneously taken to have a
particular trait, which then triggers disadvantage. But these cases are probably rare and prominent
restatements of the social model seem uninterested in them. Compare the idea that a person can be
“regarded as” disabled even though the person is not otherwise functionally impaired in the relevant way.
See 42 USC § 12102(2)(C) (defining disability as including being regarded as having an impairment);
Sutton v United Air Lines, Inc., 527 US 471, 489–92 (1999).
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mobility impairments this way: paraplegics cannot easily hike up a mountain yet their
ability to commute within a city depends on its physical design. Sometimes, moreover,
the environment will be both a necessary and a substantial factor in disadvantage. These
micro gradations allow us to better conceptualize at the macro scale. We might then
consider what portion of all trait related disadvantage (or even all disadvantage) is caused
by social factors in the senses just described.
The empirical claims of social model users can be characterized according to
these divisions. Some theorists suggest that all disability is socially constructed, in the
sense that no personal trait can be disabling without an adverse social setting. The
environment is portrayed as a necessary cause, even if not sufficient, and as the
predominant factor in all trait related disadvantage. Michael Oliver puts it this way:
[The social model] does not deny the problem of disability but locates it
squarely within society. It is not individual limitations, of whatever kind,
which are the cause of the problem but society’s failure to provide
appropriate services and adequately ensure the needs of disabled people
are fully taken into account in its social organisation. [¶] Hence disability
. . . is all the things that impose restrictions on disabled people; ranging
from individual prejudice to institutional discrimination, from inaccessible
public buildings to unusable transport systems, from segregated education
to excluding work arrangements, and so on. . . . [D]isability is wholly and
exclusively social.34
Normative prescriptions creep into Oliver’s discussion (“the problem,” “society’s
failure”). But the central message is about causation and the emphasis is on the structure
of society—including sociological phenomena such as stigma, fear, disgust, disregard,
and imperfect assumptions about an impaired person’s ability to succeed.
Less ambitious claims exist. Some disability scholars contest the suggestion that
personal traits are never sufficient causes of disadvantage. Severe pain or constant
hallucinations are surely felt by their victims, usually with negative impact. These
experiences can at most be ameliorated, but not eliminated, by adjustments to
34

Oliver, Understanding Disability at 32–33, 35 (cited in note 16). Earlier efforts include Victor
Finkelstein, Attitudes and Disabled People: Issues for Discussion 1–2, 11–13, 34–36 (International
Exchange of Information in Rehabilitation 1980) (describing disability as a social relationship which can be
eliminated if attitudes develop in certain ways), and Irving K. Zola, Missing Pieces: A Chronicle of Living
with a Disability 240–46 (Temple University 1982) (referring to the process society must go through to
come to terms with the disability it creates).
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environments.35 Thick social networks can only do so much. The most isolated of all
human beings can suffer from pain or delusion. But even those who are skeptical of the
social model in its most robust versions can accept its truth for many people in many
situations at many times. Skeptics have a hard time rejecting the steps versus ramps
example, even if they object to retrofitting on cost related grounds.
B.

Critiques
[M]ost of us simply cannot pretend with any conviction that our impairments are
irrelevant . . . .36
For all its conceptual potency, or perhaps because of it, the social model has

attracted challenges. One might have expected them to have come earlier. After all, some
social model users made strikingly broad claims about disadvantage. Perhaps the
emerging critiques are a sign of progress for disability studies scholars, who are
sometimes ignored by those worried that the field is too technical, trivial, or partisan.
Whatever the case, three lines of critique can be identified. They involve the model’s
scope, the ambiguity of disadvantage, and the connections between impairment and
social setting. Some of these challenges are powerful but none eliminate the model’s
value.
1.

Overclaiming

The first concern is common. It is that the strongest claims arising from a social
model are indefensible. Personal traits can be inhibiting by themselves or in addition to a
disabling social context, albeit depending on the individual’s goals.37 Furthermore, the
degree of this independent effect is related to the state of technology. It could be that at
35

See Jonathan Glover, Choosing Children: Genes, Disability and Design 6–8 (Oxford 2006); Crossley,
74 Notre Dame L Rev at 657–58 (cited in note 8); Stein, 153 U Pa L Rev at 602 (cited in note 15) (“There
are some workers with disabilities whose impairments cannot be ameliorated through reasonable (or even
extra-reasonable) accommodations.”); Gareth Williams, Theorizing Disability, in Albrecht, ed, Handbook
of Disability Studies at 123, 135 (cited in note 10) (criticizing the strongest instantiations of the social
model).
36
Liz Crow, Including All of Our Lives: Renewing the Social Model of Disability, in Colin Barnes and
Geof Mercer, eds, Exploring the Divide 55, 58 (Women’s Press 1996).
37
See Sally French, Disability, Impairment or Something in Between?, in John Swain et al, eds, Disabling
Barriers: Enabling Environments 17, 19 (Sage 1993) (claiming that the refusal to admit that traits can be
inhibiting oppresses those who experience the inhibitions); Tom Shakespeare and Nicholas Watson, The
Social Model of Disability: An Outdated Ideology?, in Barnartt and Altman, eds, Research in Social
Science and Disability at 9 (cited in note 19). A similar logic, pointing in a different direction, is the claim
that traits can generate unique experiences and valuable cultures.
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time 1 a physical or mental trait is independently disadvantageous, while at time 2
inexpensive technology greatly reduces the negative effect. Consider the world before
and after eyeglasses. We might guess that a greater proportion of human disadvantage
was attributable to personal traits before the invention than afterward—assuming roughly
equal levels of stigma suffered by poorly sighted and eyeglass-wearing people. Here
disadvantage is shifting but not because of inclusive social forces (apart from
technological change). Similar observations can be made about new impairments that are
physically debilitating yet not an important source of stigma. Perhaps certain repetitive
stress injuries associated with the modern assembly line and keyboard use are illustrative.
Now the balance is shifting in the other direction, toward individual impairment as a
more significant source of disadvantage. Either way, the relative mix of individual and
social factors in producing disability will fluctuate over time. It makes little sense to
claim that all “disability” is socially constructed, now and forevermore.
This criticism is empirical. It aims at accuracy in measuring the causes of
disadvantage and so it does not necessarily deny that the social model has value. But
concluding that the model can account for only a fraction of all impairment related
disadvantage will prompt a different concern: critics will begin to question whether the
social model contains an acceptably broad definition of “disability.” Once it is granted
that some disadvantage happens independently of social context, there will be a class of
people the model will not attend to and who nonetheless suffer from a physical or mental
trait.38
But this critique reveals nothing seriously amiss with a social model of disability.
Some proponents acknowledge that the model cannot explain everything about
disadvantage. They have chosen the label “disability” for a field of study and concern
involving socially produced disadvantage triggered by individual traits. No one can deny
that social systems influence disadvantage at least sometimes. The frequency of animus
and irrationality as causes of disadvantage is not zero, for example. As long as the model
can identify real social factors that contribute to disadvantage more than occasionally, it

38

See Shakespeare and Watson, The Social Model of Disability at 16 (cited in note 37) (worrying that the
model’s focus might distract us from preventing impairment).
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is no devastating objection that the model has limits. Every model does. Oliver’s message
is perhaps responsible for some of the confusion. Even he acknowledges limits, however.
After declaring that “disability is wholly and exclusively social,”39 he concedes that “the
social model is not an attempt to deal with the personal restrictions of impairment.”40
Readers should be aware that social model theorists use the term “disability” in this
manner, and theorists ought to concede that the model thereby leaves room for a distinct
and perhaps large field of inquiry into independently inhibiting personal traits.
Those who worry that the social model claims “too much” in terms of causation
might have been distracted by crude restatements. Those who worry that the model
covers “too little” in terms of what is worthy of a policy response are not undermining the
model’s use. These critics are probably dedicated to helping people who do not fit the
model, but that is a separable issue. For the same reason, cost is not an objection to the
social model. As will become clear below, the model does not generate costs on its own,
beyond any cost of information collection due to its use.
2.

“Disadvantage”

The second challenge is more serious, although it does not seem to have attracted
attention. Social model adherents are often vague about which notion of “disadvantage”
or “the problem of disability” they are interested in.41 There is more than one plausible
specification. Clearly social model users are interested in negative consequences
produced by traits plus settings. For instance, many scholars are troubled by false
inferences of mental incapacity too often associated with traits like stuttering and
deafness, while mystical powers associated with blindness are more likely to be used as
evidence of cultural contingency.42 Obviously the social model targets bad consequences.
But which?

39

Oliver, Understanding Disability at 35 (cited in note 16).
Id at 38; see also id at 41-42.
41
See, for example, Oliver, Understanding Disability at 32 (cited in note 16) (referring to “the problem”
of disability); UPIAS, Fundamental Principles of Disability at 14 (cited in note 1) (referring to “the
disadvantage or restriction of activity caused by a contemporary social organisation”). Amundson, 23 J Soc
Phil at 108–09 (cited in note 15) (concentrating on lost opportunities to construct life plans).
42
See Michael E. Monbeck, The Meaning of Blindness 59–63 (Indiana University 1973) (tracing the
connection between blindness and mysteriousness in Western culture). But see Silvers, Formal Justice at
57, 56–59 (cited in note 8) (describing a “moral model” of disability).
40
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The options might be separated into absolute and relative disadvantage. First,
social model users could incorporate a theory of inadequate human well-being that does
not depend on how others are faring. The threshold of inadequacy is difficult to define
but this theory is a coherent option. It is related to notions of subordination and human
necessities.43 Second, model users might view disadvantage in a relative sense. There is
more than one available baseline, however. The basis for comparison could be the human
species norm,44 or a similarly situated human being the same in every way except for the
trait in question, or something else.45 In addition, decisions must be made with respect to
dimensions and severity of disadvantage. Perhaps scholarly attention is not warranted for
small negative effects on particular components of human well-being. Rightly or not,
disability scholars seem uninterested in male baldness or uncommonly short and tall
people, although obesity and ugliness might attract more of their consideration.
There is no stock answer to which form of disadvantage is most worthy of
attention. But these sorts of choices are inevitable. And old. They were raised twenty-five
years ago by Hendrick Hudson Central School District Board of Education v Rowley.46
That case presented the question whether a hearing-impaired child was statutorily entitled
to a classroom sign language interpreter to help her excel academically, even though she
was already outperforming the average student. (The Supreme Court’s answer was no.47)
The lesson is that a person might be disadvantaged in the two relative senses just noted
without falling into any absolute state of disadvantage.48 These options begin to suggest
the normative judgments that surround—and are not made by—a social model of
disability.

43

See Part III.B.3.
See Ani B. Satz, A Jurisprudence of Dysfunction: On the Role of “Normal Species Functioning” in
Disabilities Analysis, 6 Yale J Health Policy, L & Ethics 221 232–238 (2006) (following the Rawlsian,
normal-species functioning theory of Norman Daniels, Just Health Care 27–28 (Cambridge 1985)).
45
See Wasserman, Philosophical Issues at 226–27 (cited in note 10).
46
458 US 176 (1982).
47
See id at 184–86, 189, 198–204, 209–10 (interpreting the statutory entitlement to a “free appropriate
public education” from participating states); id at 215 (White, dissenting) (asserting that the student
understood less than half of what was said in the classroom); but see Cedar Rapids Community School
District v Garret F., 526 US 66, 68, 79 (1999) (holding that the statute required provision of a full-time
nurse during the day where necessary to keep a ventilator-dependent quadriplegic student in school).
48
Conversely, it seems possible for a person to be subordinated without being much worse off on account
of a personal trait (for example, mildly impaired, severely impoverished children).
44
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Still, vagueness in “disadvantage” is only a problem of specification and
judgment about proper emphasis, a gap that can be filled without jeopardizing the social
model. Both absolute and relative disadvantages can be produced by an individual trait
combined with an adverse social environment. For instance, social stigma attached to
what is seen as deformity can result in severe blows to social standing, isolation, and
objectively determined subordination; but less severe social responses might yield only
disadvantage relative to the nondeformed, or to the similarly situated nondeformed. Other
combinations are possible. The upshot is that environmental factors may contribute to all
sorts of disadvantage. The social model cannot be discarded on account of any undue
reticence.
3.

Reconnection

A third critique targets the boundary between trait and setting. With the
development of postmodernism, this line of attack should have been predictable. The
social model presents another conceptual dichotomy within Western thought, nearly all of
which are deconstruction targets. In any case, the critique has some force.
To an extent, the two components of the model interact with each other. Physical
or mental traits recognized by the community as impairments (or as otherwise significant
to interaction) become part of the social setting. It is hard to believe that such traits can be
held constant over time, or that changes in their prevalence or features will not affect the
social environment. This is not to assert either a hopeful evolutionary path or a selfreinforcing dynamic of stigma and subordination. The only point is that these two causes
of disadvantage will often be impossible to completely separate.49
Similarly, the model might underestimate the social construction it means to
emphasize. Shelley Tremain contends that “impairment” is itself a socially ascribed
characteristic, an outgrowth of practices that demand the identification of difference. To
her “it seems politically naive to suggest that the term ‘impairment’ is value-neutral, . . .
as if there could ever be a description that was not also a prescription for the formulation
49

It will sometimes be difficult to discern a “medical” response from a response that restructures the
“social” environment. One example is a telecommunications device for the deaf (TDD) or a
telecommunications relay service to assist deaf/hearing communication over the telephone. Do these
technological and human intermediaries count as personal services or environmental revision?
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of the object . . . .”50 Social model users at least implicitly understand that impairment is a
subset of all traits. Even setting aside their disinterest in common ailments such as
arthritis and back pain, disability studies scholars seem to prefer a boundary between
disability and race or gender studies.51 But of course race and gender easily fit into a
generic connection between traits and social reactions. For disability studies to be even
partly independent from these inquiries, a notion of impairment separate from social
construction might be necessary. Yet insofar as both impairment and disability are
socially constructed, disabilities scholarship might miss something important.52 When
combined, the critiques described in this section suggest that the distinction between
impairment and disability begins to collapse.
Still, these deconstruction efforts are hardly at odds with the spirit of the social
model. Either perspective channels attention to surrounding social structures rather than
people identified as disabled. Neither eliminates the central insight of the social model, or
calls for anything like the individualized causation story of the medical model. While it is
true that the social model of disability cannot account for every human “disadvantage”
linked to every individual trait, the issue is specification and scope. Even its most modest
claim—that traits of individual human beings are not always the sufficient cause of
disadvantage—is powerful when set against a conventional wisdom that physical and
mental disability is only a series of personal tragedies. The fundamental question is what
the social model accomplishes on its own.

50

Tremain, 21 Soc Theory & Prac at 621 (cited in note 33) (emphasis omitted); see also Carol Thomas
and Mairian Corker, A Journey Around the Social Model, Mairian Corker and Tom Shakespeare, eds, in
Disability/Postmodernity: Embodying Disability Theory 18, 19 (Continuum 2002); see also Part III.A.1.
(discussing relevance judgments and the connection to norms).
51
See Shelley Tremain, On the Subject of Impairment, in Corker and Shakespeare, eds,
Disability/Postmodernity at 32, 41-42 (cited in note 50) (noting that social modelists do not treat race as an
impairment). Perhaps the field is defined by an interest in stigma plus functional impairment, arbitrary
academic convention, and/or a reflection of interest group politics.
52
See, for example, Shakespeare and Watson, The Social Disability at 24 (cited in note 37) (“[W]e are all
impaired.”).
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C.

Policy Correlations
Differential treatment becomes . . . a problem for which all onlookers are
responsible.53
Does the social model recommend social change? Many scholars seem to think

so. In the academic literature, prescriptions for environmental restructuring regularly
follow on the heels of the social model. This analytical surge from causation to policy is
sometimes interrupted or punctuated by the identification of a “civil rights” or “minority
group” model of disability. But as used in the law literature, the civil rights model is not
simply a causal model of disadvantage. It is a normative orientation emphasizing respect
for people with disabilities and their integration with nondisabled people.54 The social
model provides a description of how disadvantage comes about, while the civil rights
“model” suggests more or less concrete policy responses by analogy to other social
movements. The impression left by academics is that the two ideas not only fit together,
but that the former entails the latter.
Consider Mary Crossley’s important contribution. She helped import the social
model into legal scholarship. Although Crossley subsequently spells out a civil rights
model of disability policy, she also writes that “the main thrust of policy under a social
model is to get rid of disability by ‘rehabilitating’ the social and physical structures and
systems that serve to impose disadvantages on persons with impairments.”55 More
recently, Michael Stein has asserted that the social model “stresses society’s role in
constructing disability and its responsibility to rectify disability-based exclusion,” and
“expressly relies on notions of corrective justice.”56 As well, Sam Bagenstos and Margo
Schlanger state that “[t]he social model’s policy implications primarily focus not on
53

Minow, Making all the Difference at 119 (cited in note 15).
See Crossley, 74 Notre Dame L Rev at 659 (“The minority group model of disability builds on the
understanding of disability elaborated by the social model and transforms it into a political call to action.”);
Harlan Hahn, Feminist Perspectives, Disability, Sexuality, and Law: New Issues and Agendas, 4 S Cal Rev
L & Women’s Stud 97, 98, 101–02 (1994) (discussing the “minority group” model of disability and
comparing it to “second wave” feminism); Elizabeth A. Pendo, Disability, Doctors and Dollars:
Distinguishing the Three Faces of Reasonable Accommodation, 35 UC Davis L Rev 1175, 1193–94 (2002)
(analogizing the concrete goals of the civil rights movement to those of the disability rights movement); see
also Bagenstos, 114 Yale L J at 7–8 (cited in note 28) (listing anti-paternalism and integration as goals of
the movement); Michelle Fine and Adrienne Asch, Disability Beyond Stigma: Social Interaction,
Discrimination, and Activism, 44 J Soc Issues 3, 8–14 (1988).
55
Crossley, 74 Notre Dame L Rev at 658; see also Crossley, 35 Rutgers L J at 877–78 (cited in note 15).
56
Stein, 95 Cal L Rev at 93, 91 (cited in note 8).
54
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rehabilitation or charity but eliminating the physical, social, and attitudinal barriers that
make some physical and mental impairments disabling.”57
The pattern extends beyond the law journals. In a leading exploration of the
subject, philosopher Anita Silvers asserts “the medical model proposes to solve the
problem [of misalignment between individuals and social practice] by realigning
(eligible) individuals, while on the social model it is society that should be reshaped.”58
Likewise, Oliver has suggested that “the core of the social model” includes a sense that
“[i]t is society that has to change not individuals.”59 The message of David Pfeiffer’s
“disability paradigm” is the same.60 And the World Health Organization declares:
The social model of disability . . . sees the issue mainly as a socially
created problem, and basically as a matter of the full integration of
individuals into society . . . . Hence the management of the problem
requires social action, and it is the collective responsibility of society at
large to make the environmental modifications necessary for the full
participation of people with disabilities in all areas of social life. The issue
is therefore an attitudinal or ideological one requiring social change,
which at the political level becomes a question of human rights. For this
model disability is a political issue.61
Repeated suggestions that social change follows the social model are perhaps
understandable, if for no other reasons than increasing correlations and herding behavior
in scholarship. Probably more than this is at work, however. The regular connection to
policy might follow from affiliation with the disability rights movement, or a belief that
knocking down status quo assumptions about the causes of disadvantage will leave no

57

Samuel R. Bagenstos and Margo Schlanger, Hedonic Damages, Hedonic Adaptation, and Disability, 60
Vand L Rev (forthcoming 2007) manuscript at 39; see also Bagenstos, 114 Yale L J at 12 (cited in note 28)
(“[T]he proper response [under this view] is civil rights legislation . . . .”); Wendy F. Hensel, The Disabling
Impact of Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life Actions, 40 Harv CR—CL L Rev 141, 148–49 (2005); Satz,
A Jurisprudence of Dysfunction at 238–39 (cited in note 44) (“Social models of disability . . . are based
upon two premises: a right to participation in certain social endeavors (such as education, work, and travel)
and a right to particular outcomes from functioning (as distinguished from modes of functioning) within
certain environments”).
58
Silvers, Formal Justice at 85 (cited in note 8); see also id at 74.
59
Oliver, Understanding Disability at 37 (cited in note 16) (stressing political empowerment as the engine
of change).
60
Pfeiffer, The Conceptualization of Disability at 46; see also Amundson, 23 J Soc Phil at 113 (cited in
note 15).
61
WHO, International Classificaiton of Functioning, Disability, Health at 20 (cited in note 7) (emphasis
omitted).
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remaining defenses to a demand for environmental revision.62 But these conclusions must
be explained and justified. No matter how many academics combine the model’s
causation story with preferences for social reconstruction, the former can and should be
disentangled from the latter.
II. CONTROVERSIES
To help explore the gap between the model and norms, this Part reviews four
developments regarding deafness in America. The first two are technological innovations
aimed at assisting deaf people or preventing their birth. The other two involve efforts of
deaf people to sort themselves into sign language communities. These developments were
selected because they present timely controversies and because deafness is a trait suited
to social model analysis. And there is more than one public policy option: attempting to
eliminate deafness, or attempting to engineer social arrangements such that hearing does
not matter.63
A.

Technology
For centuries, people believed that only a miracle could restore hearing to the
deaf.64
Preimplantation diagnosis provides an alternative way forward. . . .65
Today’s technology makes it easier to treat or prevent deafness. Hearing aids,

which simply amplify sound, are familiar. A more invasive option is a cochlear implant, a
device approved for commercial use in the 1980s. One part of the device is a microphone
that resides outside the ear, while another part processes sounds captured by the
microphone. A transmitter sends the processed signals to a receiver implanted under the
skin. The receiver converts the signals into electrical impulses, which are collected by
electrodes and delivered to the auditory nerve. A cochlear implant does not allow its user

62

See below Part III.A.2 (discussing the movement and social construction arguments).
In 2004, about 3.1 percent of the US adult population reported having “a lot of trouble hearing” or
being “deaf,” but 3.9 percent of those below the poverty level reported as such, as did 4.8 percent of those
without a high school diploma or GED. See National Center for Health Statistics, Health: United States
258–59 table 59 (2006).
64
Philipos C. Loizou, Mimicking the Human Ear, IEEE Signal Processing Magazine 101, 102 (Sept
1998).
65
Peter Braude et al, Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis, Nature Reviews Genetics, 3 Nature 941, 942
(Dec 2002).
63
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to “hear” in the same way that hearing-able people do, but the stimulation of the auditory
nerve does allow the user to experience representations of sound. For some, perhaps
especially young children, the device might help the user develop spoken language
ability. The device has been implanted in an estimated 22,000 adults and 15,000 children.
In 2000, the Food and Drug Administration lowered the acceptable age for implantation
of one such device to twelve months old.66
These implants are not perfect. They cost thousands of dollars, there are efficacy
problems, and surgery of any kind entails risks.67 In fact, some members of Deaf culture
believe that cochlear implants are a bad choice for others. They perceive an unhealthy
urge to “fix” people who are not broken and an underestimation of deaf people’s
potential, plus a threat to the number of American Sign Language (ASL)
communicants—a core feature of Deaf culture.68 Doubts about the technology among
deaf adults, however, do not mean that hearing-able parents will reject cochlear implants
for their children. Those parents will rarely possess ASL skills at the time of their
children’s birth, and they might prefer that their children develop whatever imperfect
spoken language skills they can. Regardless of warnings and restrictions that are
appropriate now, cochlear implants will probably improve their effectiveness and
popularity over time, barring adverse regulatory intervention.
Technology is also multiplying the options for prevention, sometimes in ways that
soften the objections of moral holdouts. An important advance is preimplantation genetic
diagnosis (PGD), which works in conjunction with in vitro fertilization.69 Eggs are
fertilized in the lab, embryos are grown to about eight cells, and one is removed for
66

See FDA’s Report on New Health Care Products Approved in 2000 (Jan 18, 2001), online at
http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/answers/2001/ANS01066.html (visited April 1 2007); see generally
National Institute on Deafness and Other Communication Disorders, Cochlear Implants, online at
www.nidcd.nih.gov/health/hearing/coch.asp (visited Apr 1, 2007).
67
See Jill Elaine Hasday, Mitigation and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 103 Mich L Rev 217, 220–
21, 240–42 (2004) (reciting risks and costs of cochlear implant surgery); Jane E. Brody, For Some Who
Lost Hearing, Implants Help, NY Times D7 (Oct 3, 2006); but see Thomas J. Balkany et al, Conservation
of Residual Acoustic Hearing After Cochlear Implantation, 27 Otology & Neurotology 1083, 1087 (2006)
(finding a degree of hearing conservation in most subjects).
68
See Carol Padden and Tom Humphries, Inside Deaf Culture ch 1, 166–70 (Harvard 2005) (detailing the
criticisms of cochlear implant surgery from the perspective of Deaf culture); Carol Padden and Tom
Humphries, Deaf in America: Voices from a Culture 2–11 (Harvard 1988).
69
See Karen E. Adams, Ethical Considerations of Applications of Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis in
the United States, 22 Med & L 489, 490–91 (2003).
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genetic testing. With greater knowledge regarding the location of genes that cause
particular human traits, medical professionals are better able to screen for genetic
conditions. Thus PGD might be used for at least some types of inherited deafness.70
Standard practice is to discard any embryos judged “affected” by the conditions for
which PGD has been requested, and then implant or freeze any “unaffected” embryos.
Postfertilization genetic testing is not so new. But selective abortion might be more
problematic morally, religiously, or as a matter of health than discarding affected
embryos that never enter a human womb. When successful, PGD and selective
implantation yield a child whose genetic makeup is the product of two people who wish
to assume responsibility for parenting this same child, a result that many people seem to
value.
Like cochlear implants, PGD for the purpose of creating hearing children is
subject to more than one kind of opposition. The process is ordinarily coupled with drug
induced stimulation of the reproductive system, which comes with risks and costs.
Moreover, Deaf culture members and others can maintain similar objections to PGD.71
Preventing deafness in this fashion might be taken to suggest that deaf people are
defective and less valuable. A similar power dynamic is in play as well. Prospective
parents are making choices about the genetic design of children within a medical
institutional framework and without always understanding the real possibilities for
“disabled” people. In its worst light the result is a callous eugenics system, however
decentralized, with participation limited to those with access to the technology. At the
same time, PGD need not work in only one direction. It can be used to increase the
likelihood of a trait that mainstream culture regards as “impairment.”72

70

Genetics might account for more than 50 percent of all hearing loss. See Bronya J.B. Keats and Charles
I. Berlin, Introduction and Overview, in Bronya J.B. Keats et al, eds, Genetics and Auditory Disorders 1, 1
(Springer 2002).
71
See generally Simo Vehmas, Live and Let Die? Disability in Bioethics, 1 New Rev Bioethics 145, 153–
55 (2003) (raising ethical concerns about genetic testing).
72
See generally Carina Dennis, Deaf by Design, 431 Nature 894, (Oct 21, 2004); Darshak M. Sanghavi,
Wanting Babies Like Themselves, Some Parents Choose Genetic Defects, NY Times D5 (Dec 5, 2006).
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B.

Sorting
[W]e hold in common this resentment of efforts to fix us.73
To create . . . a world of sign language and signing culture.74
There are radically different responses to deafness. Rather than ameliorate or

eliminate the impairment, one might try to create social settings in which deafness is not
disabling. Gallaudet University is one such attempt. The school was chartered by the
federal government in 1864 as a university for deaf and hard of hearing students.75 ASL
is central to the Gallaudet community, which was a departure from the policy of
American educators in the nationalistic Progressive Era who suppressed sign language at
schools for the deaf.76 They urged that deaf children be pressed to function like the
hearing majority, attempting to read lips and vocalize words rather than using the
communication method preferred by a small network of what some regarded as
defectives. This oralism was, in the kindest light, a well-meaning form of mainstreaming.
But it was rejected at Gallaudet. ASL is now the norm on campus and visitors “who do
not know sign language are communicatively disabled.”77 Many Gallaudet students,
faculty, staff, and graduates consider sign language a central component of a visually
centered Deaf culture.78 ASL is not, after all, translated English. It is a visual language
operating in three dimensions with its own rules, linking together perhaps hundreds of
thousands of people in the U.S. alone.79 Deaf ASL users often do not consider themselves
disabled, any more than a French tourist in Maine considers herself disabled.

73

I. King Jordan, The Gallaudet Experience: Deafness and Disability, 120 Pubs Mod Lang Assn 625, 626
(2005) (comparing deaf and disability studies).
74
Marvin T. Miller, A Place of Our Own: Laurent, South Dakota 4 (2003), online at
http://www.thelaurentinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2006/10/laurentconceptpaper.pdf (visited April 1,
2007) (setting out the mission statement of the developers of Laurent, South Dakota).
75
See Albert W. Atwood, Gallaudet College: Its First One Hundred Years ch 3 (1964).
76
See Douglas Baynton, Forbidden Signs: American Culture and the Campaign Against Sign Language
4–6, 15–16 (1996) (outlining the history of oralism and opposition to it in Deaf culture).
77
Jordan, The Gallaudet Experience at 625 (cited in note 73).
78
See Padden and Humphries, Inside Deaf Culture at 2–5 (cited in note 68); Diana Jean Schemo, Turmoil
at Gallaudet Reflects Broader Debate Over Deaf Culture, NY Times A9 (Oct 21, 2006).
79
See Padden and Humphries, Deaf in America at 7–9 (cited in note 68). We lack reliable estimates of
ASL users. See Ross E. Mitchell et al, How Many People Use ASL in the United States? Why Estimates
Need Updating, 6 Sign Lang Stud 306, 307, 319–25, 328 (2006) (tracing estimates of 500,000 ASL users to
a single survey of deaf people conducted in 1972).
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Gallaudet is a designed setting in which the trait of deafness is prevalent, but the
disadvantage associated with it in other settings is not. Members of the Gallaudet
community are committed to keeping it that way. In 1988, protests by students, alumni,
faculty, and staff led to the resignation of a recently appointed president for the
university.80 Gallaudet had never had a deaf president and the protesters believed it was
time for the university to illustrate that deaf Americans are suited to positions of
authority. The administration relented. In the fall of 2006, the dynamic repeated. This
time, protesters demanded that Gallaudet’s president be not just deaf but strongly
committed to ASL on campus. Protesters again shut down the school and the
administration fired its choice for president.81 Yet Gallaudet represents moderation when
other alternatives are considered. For students, the experience is partly temporary. No one
is seriously discussing ASL as a language requirement in American schools. That would
be an unlikely change in a country where perhaps 600 thousand out of 300 million people
are deaf.82
There have been more ambitious sorting efforts. A small group of developers
worked for three years planning and promoting Laurent, South Dakota as a town for ASL
users.83 The envisioned town was advertised as ASL-friendly and a geographic focal
point for Deaf culture. Public spaces would be designed with generous sightlines, schools
would teach ASL and teach with it, sirens would be visual, and so on. The whole
community would be devoted to signing and Deaf culture. Indeed this could occur with
or without lawful authority to mandate ASL proficiency for town residents. People can
sort themselves into and away from a new municipality, once the demographics and
power structures become clear.84 Religious, racial, and other groups understand this and
80

See generally Joseph P. Shapiro, No Pity: People with Disabilities Forging a New Civil Rights
Movement 75–85 (1993).
81
See Diana Jean Schemo, At Gallaudet, Board Gives Up On New Leader, NY Times A1 (Oct 30, 2006);
Schemo, Turmoil at Gallaudet at A9 (cited in note 78).
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See Lior J. Strahilevitz, Information Asymmetries and the Rights to Exclude, 104 Mich L Rev 1835,
1850–53 (2006) (identifying exclusionary vibes as a form of informal sorting); Adam M. Samaha,
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the leverage that a local government can provide.85 Laurent was to be a community of
interest with political voice in the surrounding areas. The theory was that, in a small
pond, political power could be achieved with just a few thousand residents.
If deafness is not “disability,” Laurent was one way to prove it. The plan was to
construct a new social reality with no expiration date for its residents. And Laurent was to
be in political, economic, and social contact with surrounding populations. It was not
meant to be a place where deaf people “[do] not perceive themselves as a distinct social
group.”86 In this it was different from Gallaudet and deafness on Martha’s Vineyard. The
Vineyard was a fluke of genetic happenstance, while Gallaudet can envelop its students
for only so long. But however bold, Laurent is essentially dead. Although a town plan
was drawn up, zoning ordinances were amended, and the idea received mass media
attention, the project collapsed at almost the same instant Gallaudet protesters achieved
their victory. The Laurent development company disclosed financing hold ups in late
2006, fewer than 200 people had declared their interest in moving to the town, and the
developers began considering acquisition of land within an existing municipality as Plan
B.87
C.

Causation/Response Gaps
Each of these developments has a connection to public policy. Technological

innovation and utilization can be demanded, subsidized, discouraged, or outlawed by the
state. The same is true of sorting and ASL training. To date, U.S. policy has been
relatively decentralized. Cochlear implants and genetic screening have been approved by
FDA, but they are neither mandated nor heavily regulated in terms of the reasons for their
use. Gallaudet was chartered by the federal government and state law imposes some
restrictions on the creation of new municipalities, yet these sorting efforts are largely the
(discussing signals for sorting). On interlocal sorting and jurisdictional competition in general, see Charles
M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J Pol Econ 416, 418, 418 n 12 (1956); see also Paul
W. Rhode and Koleman S. Strumpf, Assessing the Importance of Tiebout Sorting: Local Heterogeneity
from 1850 to 1990, 93 Am Econ Rev 1648 (2003) (empirically testing for Tiebout sorting).
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Local Control, and the Implications of Being Darker than Brown, 23 Harv CR—CL L Rev 415 (1988);
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87
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product of private choices. With strong enough justifications and political forces, public
policy might shift. Society might begin to treat genetic screening and cochlear implants
as morally questionable and unjustifiably stigmatizing for the current generation of deaf
people, or it might invest more resources in nonverbal communication methods including
ASL, or it might heavily subsidize signing communities. Moving policy in the opposite
direction is equally possible in theoretical terms. A collective decision might be made to
hasten the elimination of deafness-related genes, or to mainstream all deaf people and
discourage ASL as inappropriately separatist.
The question is whether the social model can underwrite any policy, in any
direction. The answer is no: the model shows us causes of disadvantage, but what we do
about it is a matter of contested norms. Opposition to social restructuring as a remedy for
disability need not be the product of ignorance, insensitivity, false consciousness, or
political immorality. It might be an understandable reaction within a coherent normative
framework. There just is no necessary connection between causes of harm (or
disadvantage) and remedies for harm (or disadvantage). This simple point can be
confirmed by comparing similar situations in which an individual is not the sole cause of
his or her disadvantage, and yet it is at least debatable (1) whether any remedy is justified
or (2) which remedy is proper. Consider the following:
Your inability to get through this door is caused by the confluence of more
than one factor:
1. You murdered your husband to collect insurance proceeds, and
because of that we prosecuted, convicted, and imprisoned you.
2. Your skin has a high melanin content, our customers prefer to interact
with pink-skinned people, and so we did not hire you.
3. You are Catholic, we hate Catholics, and so we did not hire you.
4. You became wheelchair-bound after diving headfirst into a shallow
pool, and we built this building with stairs leading to the entrance.
5. Your genes do not allow you to walk, your parents did not genetically
screen and selectively abort such embryos, you use a wheelchair, and
we built this building with stairs leading to the entrance.
Each of these statements has a similar logical structure, and that structure mimics the
social model of disability. Choices or practices of the broader society are disadvantaging
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the subject of the statements. But we can be confident that almost no one will demand
social change and liberation of the subject in all of the above examples.
Take statement 1. The subject is deprived of liberty by a physical barrier (her cell
door) not only because of her decision to kill her husband (we might say she has the trait
of spouse killer), but also because institutional forces responded in a particular way
(officers of the state engaged in apprehension, prosecution, imprisonment). They need not
have been designed to respond that way or exercised their powers in this case. But they
were and they did. Very few observers will object to the response. With the possible
exception of the killer, perhaps every observer will support some kind of social response
on any of several familiar theories: retribution, incapacitation, specific and general
deterrence. Assuming accurate adjudication of guilt, no affirmative defense, defensible
sentencing, and so on, no plausible normative theory dictates any liberating remedy for
the killer.
Statements 2 and 3 prompt different normative reactions. Like statement 1, these
situations involve a subject who suffers on account of a social or institutional reaction to
an individual trait. There is nothing natural and immutable about pinker skinned people
preferring not to interact with darker skinned people, or non-Catholics hating Catholics—
it might not have been a foreordained biological or social development that the pink/dark
skin or Catholic/non-Catholic distinctions came about, or that given the distinction people
would have the opportunity to interact across those categories. In any event, statements 2
and 3 involve animus or irrational distinctions between people. Statement 2 describes a
business decision that is derivative of indefensible social preferences, but the engine of
discrimination in those statements is basically the same. If we agree that the traits of skin
color and Catholicism are unjustifiable bases for economic outcomes, and that social or
institutional practices should be changed rather than those who suffer from the practices,
a particular remedy must be selected. And there is room for debate. One might prefer
antidiscrimination regulation and litigation over subsidies and public education
campaigns (or vice versa), or one might hope that marketplace competition will take care
of the problem. But we should perceive a structural similarity among statements 1, 2, and
3 without making anything like the same normative commitment to remedy the identified
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disadvantages. At a minimum it should be accepted that a normative framework is
mediating a logical gap between causes of disadvantage and the appropriate response.
Finally, consider statements 4 and 5. They are variations on the example nearly
always used to illustrate the social model. Here the disadvantage involves a trait that
impairs the ability to move by walking in conjunction with the architectural preference of
others for stairs. By now, the setup has a familiar form. It is possible to draw a normative
distinction between the two statements. One might believe the subject in statement 4 is
morally responsible for his impairment, or that society should be careful about awarding
remedies where it might reduce incentives to be careful. Either position militates against
a legal remedy, without necessarily deciding the outcome in statement 5. That situation
effectively removes responsibility for the relevant impairment from the subject, while
highlighting the possibility that third parties (here, the parents) could have taken steps to
prevent producing a child with the impairment. Perhaps that fact will influence the choice
between reconstructing the environment we have been left with and engineering the
human beings we create. Even if the parents’ opportunity is irrelevant to the policy
response, there is still the issue of cost. Is it justifiable to retrofit the building in light of
scarce resources and other needs? Should obligations of social restructuring only apply
going forward? What is the correct timeframe within which to answer these questions?
This choice might be much more difficult than the issue of murder for cash in statement
1; but there is a choice to be made, and it is irreducibly normative in a way that cannot be
solved by enhancing the accuracy of our portrait of causation.
All of this applies to the Deaf culture controversies. At least part of any
disadvantage associated with deafness fits the social model. Lack of hearing can be
inhibiting when others communicate with the spoken word. More than one response to
this situation is possible: one might decide that no response is appropriate considering
resource constraints, or that deaf people should have subsidized access to cochlear
implants, or that genetic screening should be used to minimize the number of deaf people,
or that ASL instruction should be expanded, or that deaf people should have greater
opportunities to sort themselves into sign language communities—or the opposite of any
of these responses. To be sure, our country has progressed to the point where few if any
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will attempt to justify treating physically or mentally impaired individuals like the killer
in statement 1. It is no longer so impolite to be disabled,88 and forced segregation is less
popular in the U.S. today,89 let alone coerced sterilization.90 But the recognition of
multiple causal factors in the generation of disadvantage is not an answer to the question,
“What do we do now?”
From a different direction, David Wasserman hits this point in an illuminating
exploration of how disability studies might productively interface with political and
moral philosophy. Wasserman acknowledges the role of social factors in generating
disadvantage. Ultimately, however, he indicates that causal responsibility should be
irrelevant to societal obligations to alleviate disadvantage. In that sense we ought to
“break the link between causation and responsibility.”91 Even if it were granted that
individual impairments must be attributed solely to “natural causes, . . . their source or
locus will have no direct relevance on most plausible accounts of distributive justice.
What will matter on those accounts is the cost to others of alleviating those disadvantages
and the possible intrusiveness or indignity of particular forms of alleviation.”92
Wasserman’s position complements the argument here. He asserts that social factors are
not necessary to trigger moral obligations of environmental reconstruction; in this article
I have argued that they are not sufficient for policy responses, either.93 The degree to
which egalitarian (or any other) moral theory obligates society to alleviate this sort of
disadvantage is explored below.
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See, for example, Chicago Municipal Code § 36-34 (repealed 1974) (imposing fines on people who are
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III. SOCIAL MODEL FUNCTIONS
The discussion is quickly reaching the deepest waters of contemporary moral and
ethical debate, but the difficulty of the issues makes the social model’s limits apparent.
Even from a perspective open to perceiving both individual and social causes of
disadvantage, the situations just canvassed are still identical without a normative basis for
judgment. The social model will not distinguish among them, yet every reader will. It is a
minor mystery why this separation between causation and policy is not already explicit in
the social model literature. The following pages suggest answers to that question, and
then turn to general normative frameworks that might make use of the model.
A.

Personal and Political
Disability is something imposed on top of our impairments.94
To those steeped in disability scholarship, the analysis thus far might seem

strangely decoupled from the intellectual underpinnings of the social model. This adverse
response could have two bases. One is the manner in which people judge relevance; the
other involves the social movement that helped generate the model. But neither is enough
to rebut the claim. Separating the social model from policy commitments through the
medium of normative frameworks remains logical and useful, even after these two
arguments for connection are understood.
1.

Judging relevance

One way to connect the social model to social policy is by accepting the
mediating role of normative frameworks while questioning how the model’s causation
story could have been judged important enough to tell.
Countless observations about human events and their causes can be made but are
not. Instead people make judgments regarding what is worth understanding and what is
better left uninvestigated, even if this judgment is only implicit. Observations that do
capture our attention might be the product of a normative framework. I might decide that
I am morally obligated to help alleviate the long-term subordination of a class of people
whenever the subordination is the product of moral wrongs committed by dominant
94
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human beings. With this normative orientation, certain observations become relevant. I
will want to know which classes of people are perpetually driven down by other groups
and what the justification for that disadvantage might be. People tend to find what they
look for, and the latter is not always randomly determined.95 This dynamic might be selfreinforcing. Knowledge about one aspect of the world might make additional knowledge
within that domain easier to acquire than other information. And what we know can
affect what we are willing to do. It is not as if additional information about the world
never instigates moral or ethical evolution.
Application of this idea to the social model is straightforward. A reason for
paying attention to the model’s causation story (perhaps the only strong reason) is
because it speaks to normative commitments about what information is relevant to human
judgment. Indeed the social model’s observation about disadvantage might have been
impossible without a normative framework that made the observation important. Oliver
himself drew on Marxist themes and was a wheelchair user when he began developing
his version of the model,96 and his forerunners had identified social causes of disability to
understand the appropriate remedies.97 In this way, the model is inescapably normative.
But this does not undercut the claim here—that no policy response is dictated by
accepting the model’s take on the causes of disadvantage. If anything, the preceding
account of relevance judgments strengthens that claim. Insofar as a judgment about
relevance suggests a normative framework, those who pay attention to the social model
are operating one. All this can demonstrate is a correlation between social model
enthusiasts and their norms—even those who learn about the model’s causation account
before deciding that social change is warranted. We are left without guidance on which
frameworks are connected to the social model’s causation story (which frameworks make
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problem, knows that the cause must first be identified.”).
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that story relevant) and still less guidance on which framework is most convincing. One
can logically accept that the relevance of a factual observation is linked to normative
objectives and yet reject any allegiance to those objectives. This rejection might be
morally wrong but it need not result from misunderstanding the relationship between
social practices and disadvantage.
2.

The movement

The second connection is more apparent. The social model’s intellectual history
might show a correlation between acceptance of the model and a fairly predictable range
of policy positions. Indeed, the social model was an outgrowth of social movements. The
raw material for it can be found in post-1960s organizing by people with physical and
mental impairments.98 Similar notions were percolating elsewhere,99 but a social model
of disability was driven to the forefront by a movement of disabled people dissatisfied
with existing institutions and policies.
Participants sought to define disability, and thus the movement, in accord with
their experience and objectives. A social model could help communicate objections to
status quo thinking that treated impairments as defects that should be fixed by
individualized medical care. That conception seemed confining: it could direct any
disability policy away from environmental revision and it might suggest that any moral
responsibility for adjustment rests with the impaired individual (acting in accord with
doctor’s orders). A social model of disability would push the other way. It had the
potential to destabilize unexamined assumptions about disadvantage, and weaken
resistance to change based on the conviction that impairment-related disadvantage was
the invariable product of nature and necessity.100 This was arguably critical to the
movement. Even if a social model entails nothing particularly affirmative about the shape
of public policy, it might knock out the first line of defense for the status quo. A social
model of disability might break open the policy space.
98
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This goal has been significant for other intellectual movements. Ann Oakley
recharacterized gender roles as contingent social constructs, like caste, to repudiate
naturalistic defenses of standard operating procedures.101 There is also an association
with studies of race as socially constructed rather than biologically meaningful.102 As
well, legal realists and their intellectual compatriots charted a similar path. Some of them
worked to demolish the idea that classical liberal rights of property and contract—to the
extent they could be made coherent—were the predestined natural order of things. That
version of rights was man-made, norm-laden, and government-backed.103 At the same
time, the realists were not under the impression that eliminating status quo defenses
established the proper contours of law. “[T]he recognition of private property as a form
of sovereignty is not itself an argument against it,” Morris Cohen wrote; instead “it is
necessary to apply to the law of property all those considerations of social ethics and
enlightened public policy which ought to be brought to the discussion of any just form of
government.”104
Returning to the disability rights movement, developments in England become
especially important. In the 1970s, a debate emerged among those interested in improving
the welfare of physically impaired people in Great Britain.105 One faction, including the
Disability Alliance, sought an income support entitlement from the government. Another
faction, spearheaded by the Union of the Physically Impaired Against Segregation
101

See Oakley, Sex, Gender, and Society at 204 (cited in note 22).
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(UPIAS), considered that effort either inadequate or misguided. UPIAS was formed in
part to help people exit residential care facilities.106 For them, cash payments were of less
concern than transforming their day-to-day living arrangements from dependence on
caregivers to independence and wider social integration. In this essentially
institutionalized setting, medical and bureaucratic “experts” were sometimes seen as
more problem than solution. Members of UPIAS and the Alliance met in 1976 to discuss
their differences. The rift was not eliminated and each faction issued a statement. UPIAS
members coalesced around a commentary drafted in important part by Victor Finkelstein
and entitled Fundamental Principles of Disability. It includes a clear declaration of what
would later become known as the social model: “it is society which disables physically
impaired people,” the document asserts, and goes on to distinguish “the physical
impairment” from “the social situation, called ‘disability’, of people with such
impairment.”107
Given this history, it is not surprising that original proponents of the social model
supported social reconstruction to ameliorate disadvantage. That goal was the inspiration
for the model in the first place. Like the argument from relevance above, social model
originators were already in the process of committing to social change to improve their
situation. The model was an accoutrement to the movement. In addition, the disability
rights social movement was taking place shortly after important successes of the black
civil rights movement in the U.S. One part of that movement repudiated notions that skin
color was associated with inferiority, and demanded the end of racial segregation. A
significant part of the disability rights message was not much different.108
This context, moreover, included incentives to push the causation claims of the
social model every bit as far as they could logically reach, plus some. First, the model’s
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causation story has a positive emotional and psychological effect on some people with
impairments. The effect is not uniform across all individuals, obviously, but it does
appear that self-esteem can be elevated when one shares causal responsibility for
hardship with others—especially if those others produced the hardship out of ignorance
or spite. Liz Crow, who questions claims that social factors dictate all disability, also
writes that the model “gave me an understanding of my life, shared with thousands, even
millions, of other people around the world, and I clung to it.”109 Second, the model
delivers a simple message for interest group organizing. Social movement organizers
could tap into masses of impaired people who were otherwise dissimilar but who shared a
latent outrage or desire not to be artificially disadvantaged.110 Third, the message of
shared or shifted responsibility undermined conventional wisdom insofar as it affiliated
with the medical model. By deemphasizing any significant functional limitation flowing
from individual traits, including pain, members of the social movement also avoided
providing fuel for the medical model. Directing attention away from personal impairment
might make it easier for others to see equal human worth.111
As physically impaired people such as Finkelstein and Oliver became academics,
and as others in academia continued to work on disability issues in the 1980s, the social
model became an intellectual export.112 It moved from interest group device to
intellectual tool. If one views disability studies scholars as members of the disability
rights social movement, then perhaps there is nothing more to say about the connection
between the social model and public policy. Even if the two are not necessarily connected
as a matter of logic, they are wound together as a matter of history and politics. That the
movement expanded into university positions makes no difference on this score.
109

Crow, Including All at 55 (cited in note 36). See also Shakespeare and Watson, The Social Model at 9
(cited in note 37).
110
See Shakespeare and Watson, The Social Model at 11 (cited in note 37); Sue A. Krenek, Note, Beyond
Reasonable Accommodation, 72 Tex L Rev 1969, 1977 (1994) (“The very exclusion that kept people with
disabilities from participating in society eventually served as a catalyst for the formation of the disabilityrights movement.”); French, Disability at 24 (cited in note 37) (“[D]isabled people, whatever their
impairments, share many problems.”).
111
See Oliver, The Politics of Disablement at 38-39 (cited in note 2); Crow, Including All at 57 (cited in
note 36.
112
See Simi Linton, Claiming Disability: Knowledge and Identity 118-19 (NYU 1998) (outlining the
various disciplines incorporating disability studies); id at 155 (“[D]isability studies is an intellectual as well
as political endeavor.”); Catherine J. Kudlick, Disability History: Why We Need Another “Other”, 108
Amer Hist Rev 763, 763-64 (2003) (describing the growth of disability studies).
Draft of April 22, 2007

36

And yet the model cannot be so easily appropriated. Its idea of causation is not the
intellectual property of a social movement or its academic adherents. The idea can be
communicated to and adopted by others. In fact, the social movement itself has been
committed to spreading the model beyond its membership. Once the audience becomes
more skeptical about social change, however, even self-interested advocates might shift
their arguments. If nothing else, this is a tactical necessity. But of course more than
interest group tactics should be considered. Outsiders to the movement will often be
operating within regularized analytical structures. They might have selected some
relatively generic normative approach with which to assess public policy, moral
obligation, and ethical choices. If so, the link between social causes and social
restructuring is anything but obvious.
Two points of caution and clarification are worth making here. First, there is no
denying that disability law scholarship is often overtly normative. Academics debate
whether disability should be treated like a species of stigma-based inequality,113 whether
“accommodation” is meaningfully different from other antidiscrimination norms,114 and
whether transfer payments are an acceptable method of remedying trait-related
disadvantage as opposed to social restructuring.115 These are important issues.
Participants in these debates are often working toward normative theories that will help
guide policymaking. A problem arises, however, when the social model’s account of
causation is presented as reason for social change. This is true regardless of one’s
normative standard for evaluating disability policy—be it antidiscrimination law to
combat stigma, social welfare rights to achieve greater equality, or something else.116
Perceiving the social factors contributing to disadvantage will deepen our understanding
of causation and it might illuminate possibilities for action; but it will not independently
justify that action. Neither “is” nor “can” equals “ought.”117
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Second and related, the social model’s inability to justify social change is a
function of the amount of normative argument that cannot be taken for granted. Of course
if all points favoring social change must be granted, and the only issue left open is
causation, then the social model can conclude the argument. This might be the sense of
many in the disability rights movement. For others, however, much less territory will be
settled and the recognition of social forces will not be the only outstanding issue. In these
cases, the right principles for decision will be open for discussion, or at least the social
model will provide no help in selecting them. Like legal realists assessing the character of
property and contract law, thoughtful participants should want to understand the extent of
social construction in disability while—not instead of—grappling with policy options.
B.

Policy Goals
The social problem of the poverty of physically impaired people requires for its
solution the same intellectual rigour as any other problem which is approached
scientifically, not less.118
A fairly small percentage of the population can be counted as members of the

disability rights social movement. But many other members of society, perhaps all, have
a responsibility or an opportunity to think about which disability policy we should have.
One manner in which this thinking takes place is through general normative frameworks;
and a few disability law scholars are using them.119 But progress has been slow. The law
literature is marked by undefended commitments and occasional formalism. True, the
dissection of statutes and case law deserves an important place in legal scholarship. It can
be unmatched in significance for practicing lawyers, judges, and regulators and it is often
poorly done by nonlawyers. At the same time, this focus dramatically narrows the
with a normative commitment to social change. There is nothing inherently wrong with this, assuming the
combination is apparent to readers. But even when such definitional bundling is obvious, one should be
careful not to merge the two claims conceptually. The causation claim on its own will not establish the
normative claim, while the normative claim can, if accepted, make the causation claim important.
118
UPIAS Commentary at 13 (cited in note 1).
119
See generally Elizabeth A. Pendo, Substantially Limited Justice? The Possibilities and Limits of a
New Rawlsian Analysis of Disability-Based Discrimination, 77 St. John’s L Rev 225 (2003) (proposing a
framework for ADA cases); Carlos A. Ball, Autonomy, Justice, and Disability, 47 UCLA L Rev 599 (2000)
(critiquing libertarianism and following Sen); Crossley, 35 Rutgers L J at 880-84 (cited in note 15)
(referencing Rawls and Dworkin); Bagenstos, 86 Va L Rev at 401-02, 445-66 (cited in note 9) (interpreting
the ADA in accord with social movement objectives); Pamela S. Karlan and George Rutherglen,
Disabilities, Discrimination, and Reasonable Accommodation, 46 Duke L J 1, 22-41 (1996) (investigating
ADA premises); see also Mark S. Stein, Distributive Justice and Disability: Utilitarianism Against
Egalitarianism (Yale 2006) (promoting utilitarianism).
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normative conversation. And it is not as if disability studies scholars outside of the law
schools have filled every gap.
The argument here is not that a general normative framework is superior to
overtly partisan interests. There is no perfect method of knowing whether rigorous
adherence to Kantian duties is a better experience than being part of the disability rights
movement. In terms of individual fulfillment, one might not be any deeper or different
than the other. Nor will I privilege one normative orientation over another. My limited
ambition is to illustrate ways in which the social model interacts with general normative
frameworks. The frameworks will be stylized to keep the analysis moving, and
boundaries might be suggested where there is great nuance. But this simplification will
not preclude judgments on two questions that some scholars believe are already answered
by accepting a social model view of causation: whether a given normative framework
will yield (1) any policy response to disability and, if so, (2) social reconstruction rather
than personal assistance.120 The results are sometimes unexpected.
1.

Libertarian

The libertarian creed is excited by the worth of individual persons and their
choices, as long as those choices do not cause harm to nonconsenting third parties.121 It
recognizes human agents as possessing ownership over themselves along with rights to
acquire property under certain conditions. Libertarianism can therefore purport to
accommodate a range of ideas about the good life, and even many actions premised on
that plurality of visions, depending on precisely how the boundaries of “harm” and
“cause” are worked out. Under this approach, preservation of a properly defined
individual liberty can be described as a deontological side-constraint that needs no (in

120

This simple bifurcation for the purpose of analysis hopefully will not obscure all of the steps and
uncertainties in a persuasive argument about disability policy. Among them are: (1) whether the
disadvantage at issue is morally relevant—whether it ought to be considered a social problem; (2) whether
one can accurately identify a social cause of disadvantage in the given situation; (3) whether any such
social cause is unjustified, irrational, or illegitimate; (4) whether attempting to eliminate any such social
cause is feasible and cost-justified in light of predictable gains and available alternatives. Each of these
questions is in play below.
121
See John Stuart Mill, On Liberty ch 1 (Penguin Books 1974); Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and
Utopia 33 (Basic Books 1974); Richard J. Arneson, Perfectionism and Politics, 111 Ethics 37, 41 (2000)
(explaining that, for libertarians, “the theory of right fences in the theory of good”); Jan Narveson, The
Libertarian Idea 7, 13, 59-60 (Temple 1988).
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fact it defies) utilitarian justification regarding any collective good.122 The basic thought
is linked to John Stuart Mill, among others, although he was a self-described utilitarian
whose conclusions differ from modern libertarianism. He famously wrote that “the only
purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized
community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical
or moral, is not a sufficient warrant.”123
A second streak in libertarian thought is a selective skepticism of government
action and the promotion of private ordering (albeit often backed by the force of the
state124). This public/private distinction was not so prominent for Mill, who expressed
fears about oppressive social norms.125 But modern proponents tend to be clear about
their preference for private ordering. Thus today’s libertarian is likely to oppose any
social welfare rights (“rights to be given positive assistance, aid, or nurturance by
others”126), even though these disfavored rights will be defined to preserve coercive
government enforcement of contracts, property rights, and anti-fraud laws. The provision
of certain public goods, such as national defense, financed by mandatory taxation are also
possibilities for squishy classical liberals—without dropping suspicions regarding the
motives, competence, or efficacy of officials insulated from market pressures.127 And
some brands of libertarian theory, such as Robert Nozick’s, leave room for government
efforts to rectify past injustice presently disadvantaging a class of people. This state
function might include compensating a presently disadvantaged class for injustice in a
past generation.128 Otherwise, a minimalist state is the norm.
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See, for example, Nozick, Anarchy at 29-35 (cited in note 121).
Mill, On Liberty at 68 (cited in note 121).
124
See Cohen, 13 Cornell L Q at 11 (cited in note 103); Hale, 38 Pol Sci Q at 470-73 (cited in note 103)
(relating the law of property to economic ordering).
125
See Mills, On Liberty at 68 (cited in note 121) (referring to “the moral coercion of public opinion”).
126
Arneson, 111 Ethics at 41 (cited in note 121).
127
See Richard A. Epstein, Can Anyone Beat the Flat Tax?, 19 Soc Phil & Policy 140, 142-49 (2002)
(reviewing the libertarian debate over the proper form and function of taxation). See also Hadley Arkes,
News for the Libertarians: The Moral Tradition Already Contains the Libertarian Premises, 29 Harv J L &
Pub Policy 61, 65 (2005) (“[B]efore we remove private choice and restrict personal freedom, the law
carries the burden of showing that there is something truly wrong.”); cf Fried, 32 Phil & Pub Affairs at 70
(cited in note 103) (critiquing separation of self- and resource ownership via Locke’s proviso).
128
See Nozick, Anarchy at 151-53, 173, 230-21 (cited in note 121).
123
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Straightaway we should expect difficulties in triggering a policy response to
disability. The barrier to action, moreover, spans both relevant inquiries: whether a given
normative framework suggests any policy response at all and, if so, whether the response
ought to be individualized support or social restructuring. The modern libertarian’s
skepticism of state action is an obvious problem for disability rights advocates.129
Regardless of whether disabled people are now in an unjustly disadvantaged position,
many libertarians will doubt that the heavy hand of government regulation will do more
good than harm. Consider the ADA. Whatever positive results it might deliver to its class
of beneficiaries, libertarian theory directs us to protect the choices of people who would
rather not interact with mentally or physically impaired people. Whether a vast majority
of the political community disagrees with those preferences is irrelevant.
Even setting aside robust protection of discriminatory preferences, the existence
of disadvantage is not a sufficient reason to justify state assistance. Libertarianism makes
certain forced wealth transfers impermissible. This might apply to assistance for medical
technology and sign language communities. Libertarianism presumably will allow
privately organized sorting efforts and ASL training, along with private choices to
purchase cochlear implants or genetic screening services (whether to maximize or
minimize the probability that a deaf child will be born), to the extent that the purchaser or
his/her contract for private insurance will cover the costs. But tax-paid subsidies for any
of these activities seem extremely unlikely. Doubts about the efficacy and efficiency of
regulation might be supported by empirical studies in employment. They suggest that
ADA employer mandates have at best not changed the employment prospects of disabled
people, and might have worsened them.130 Now, such data do not speak to other disability

129

See Richard A. Epstein, Forbidden Grounds: The Case Against Employment Discrimination Laws
482-88 (Harvard 1992).
130
See Bagenstos, 114 Yale L J at 19-22 (cited in note 28) (collecting studies); Christine Jolls, Identifying
the Effects of the Americans with Disabilities Act Using State-Law Variation: Preliminary Evidence on
Educational Participation Effects 9 (American Law and Economics Assoc Annual Meetings Paper No 62,
2004), online at http://law.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1078&context=alea (visited Mar 31,
2007) (finding a positive effect on educational participation in three states that had no pre-ADA
employment discrimination protection for disability); Christine Jolls and J.J. Prescott, The Effects of
“Reasonable Accommodation” Requirements and Firing Costs on the Employment of Individuals with
Disabilities 26-28 (unpublished manuscript, 2004), online at
http://client.norc.org/jole/SOLEweb/jolls03.pdf (visited Mar 31, 2007) (distinguishing accommodation
mandates from other mandates, and connecting negative employment effects to whether the ADA was an
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legislation; it might be that architectural changes, cash subsidies, or education campaigns
will show greater success. But at first cut, libertarianism might seem insensitive to
demands for disability law of any kind, and certainly the kind of social engineering
promoted by many disability rights advocates.
There are complications, however. One of them is connected to the social model
and the legal realist assault on classical liberal rights.131 In short, there is room to
seriously question the coherence of libertarianism as characterized so far. Recall that a
motivation for highlighting social forces in creating disability was to eviscerate status quo
perceptions that disadvantage is natural or unavoidable. The truth is that some
disadvantage can be moderated or eliminated if standard operating procedures are
adjusted. Sometimes the cost of that adjustment will be considered modest and not
injurious to others affected by the change; in other circumstances adjustment will be
considered expensive and painful. Either way, by complicating causal responsibility for
disadvantage, the social model might destabilize certain ostensibly libertarian policy
outcomes. Libertarians need a protocol for assigning entitlements, defining compensable
harm, and identifying relevant causal chains. Perhaps a social model of disability reveals
these tasks as more difficult or even impossible without additional normative
architecture. Is it apparent that an unemployed deaf person has not been “harmed” by
predominant modes of communication chosen by potential employers? That her physical
makeup “caused” this problem? That the standard method of communication is
“necessary”? Why? There are methods for resolving these questions but libertarianism is
not clearly one of them.132
If libertarianism is viable, perhaps with additional assumptions about harms and
rights, it might nevertheless leave two grounds on which a response to disability might
innovation compared to prior state law). It could be that those who qualify as “disabled” under the ADA
and who obtain jobs are thereafter more likely to keep them because of the statute.
131
See text accompanying notes 103-104.
132
See Kelman, Strategy or Principle?, at 10 n 8 (cited in note 115). Other complications with a nodisability-policy vision of libertarianism are (1) government might expend greater resources per capita to
protect the property rights of the weakest among us, including people with mental and physical
impairments, see Ball, 47 UCLA L Rev at 622-24 (cited in note 119), (2) government may retain power to
charter municipalities or universities and therefore would at least facilitate sorting efforts, and (3) a policy
decision would have to be made as to whether people enjoy liberty to genetically engineer or surgically
alter children before they are (legally) emancipated. These zones of “private” conduct are not law-free.
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rest. First is the possibility of rectifying past injustice, even across generations. The idea
can be traced to Aristotle’s corrective justice,133 whereby (identifiable) wrongdoers must
correct wrongs they have done to (identifiable) victims commensurate with the injury
caused.134 Some forms of oppression suffered by impaired people qualify for such
correction. There are no doubt acts of unjustifiable oppression against impaired people
taking place today.
There is a larger and more interesting question. It is whether a libertarian position
can endorse state assistance to rectify group disadvantage caused by the unjust acts or
omissions of another group and in the distant past. This seems possible, although
everything depends upon specification of the normative theory and the particular
historical facts surrounding a given disabled class. The issue has been debated in the
context of slavery reparations where some suggest that corrective justice reaches only
harms done within a more direct personal relationship, while others accept no such
restriction on the basic principle.135 Another division might occur over the propriety of
collective responsibility of any kind.136 Finally, there will be disagreement over remedies.
Commonly the wrong will not be perfectly reversible, or not without enormous social
costs, especially when multiple generations are involved. Imperfect substitutes and rough
compensation might then be in order, assuming any remedy is still appropriate.137 That
said, it is not hard to imagine a specification of corrective justice reaching groups and
133

See Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics Book V.ii at 267 (Harvard 1926) (H. Rackham, trans)
(describing particular justice as divided into corrective and distributive, the former dealing with injury and
the later with merit).
134
See, for example, Jules L. Coleman, The Practice of Principle: In Defence of a Pragmatist Approach to
Legal Theory 15 (Oxford 2001) (“[I]ndividuals who are responsible for the wrongful losses of others have
a duty to repair the losses.”); Stephen R. Perry, On the Relationship Between Corrective Justice and
Distributive Justice, in Jeremy Horder, Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence 237, 237-38, 263 (Oxford 2000);
Ernest J. Weinrib, The Idea of Private Law chs 3-4 (Harvard 1995). A helpful review of the Aristotelian
and Nozickian corrective justice ideas is Katrina M. Wyman, Is There a Moral Justification for Redressing
Historical Injustices? 20-41 (unpublished manuscript, 2007) (on file with author).
135
Compare Wyman, Is There a Moral Justification at 22-29 (cited in note 134) (discussing both an
identity condition and the theoretical longevity of collective agents), with David Lyons, Corrective Justice,
Equal Opportunity, and the Legacy of Slavery and Jim Crow, 84 BU L Rev 1375, 1384-86, 1396-97 (2004)
(emphasizing the federal government’s responsibility as an ongoing institution and the continuing
inequality in life prospects).
136
See Ellen Frankel Paul, Set-Asides, Reparations, and Compensatory Justice, in John W. Chapman, ed,
NOMOS XXXII: Compensatory Justice 97, 101-102, 114-15, 120-22 (1991).
137
See Jeremy Waldron, Redressing Historic Injustice, 52 U Toronto L J 135, 152-160 (2002) (discussing
suppression of historic injustice by changed circumstances).
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“their” histories. Nozick’s rectification principle, which turns on the historical propriety
of present entitlements, seems to allow for it.138
Thus the segregation of deaf people and the systematic effort to eliminate sign
language in schools could qualify as misconduct warranting government remedies.
Although it might not be clear when Deaf culture came about, and past generations of
deaf people are not necessarily biologically related to today’s, in this instance arguably
one cohesive group suffered unjustifiably at the hands of another with some residual
disadvantages carrying forward. Concerted exclusion of certain disabled people from the
political process might also qualify. Deprivation of political voice, a libertarian might
conclude, is an injustice that distorts policy outcomes in a compensation-warranting
manner. Perhaps this account fits the prevalence of stairs over ramps in pre-ADA
architecture.139 Retrofitting is typically expensive, but maybe past decisions to ignore the
interests of wheelchair users passed up cheap opportunities for universal design and were
morally indefensible. Finally, it could be that lasting disadvantage must be corrected even
at the expense of relatively innocent people. It is not clear what kind of remedy would be
in order, but the argument for social reconstruction is at least on the table.
Even if libertarianism cannot support rectification for disability-related
disadvantage, there is still a way in which the social model might be relevant. Libertarian
theory is designed to allow private charity.140 Individuals may choose to support others,
regardless of whether government welfare programs should be abolished. Each person
might have a different preference for donating and for the identity of worthy recipients.
Nevertheless, individuals living in the libertarian fantasy will be making charitable
choices and those choices might depend on an understanding of disadvantage and its
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See Nozick, Anarchy at 150-53 (cited in note 121). See also Crossley, 35 Rutgers L J at 884-88 (cited
in note 15) (discussing accommodation for people with disabilities as an implication of corrective justice
for exclusionary social structures).
139
See Silvers, Formal Justice at 74 (cited in 8) (“If the majority of people, instead of just a few, wheeled
rather than walked, graceful spiral ramps instead of jarringly angular staircases would connect lower to
upper floors of buildings.”). But see Samuel Issacharoff and Pamela S. Karlan, The Hydraulics of
Campaign Finance Reform, 77 Tex L Rev 1705, 1718 (1999) (“Without some idea of how much influence
or power a group should enjoy, it is hard to conclude that its influence or power has been diluted.”).
140
I mean charity in its broadest sense, including any voluntary efforts or gifts to assist others. Whether
private charity is a good substitute for government, considering collective action problems and
countervailing moral claims to equitable outcomes, is another issue.
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causes. This seems especially likely if the best libertarian theory would demand a
government remedy for disability-based disadvantage, but for practical doubts about the
efficacy and efficiency of such state action. Individual private choice to assist disabled
people is not subject to the same objection. Assuming a desire and an effective method of
delivering charity, then, donors will be forced to decide how their assistance ought to be
used.
No apparent reason dictates that charitable assistance would or should come in the
form of cash or medical technology or psychological counseling for disabled people. A
donor is equally free to determine that her money, time, or other pro bono resources are
most appropriately—even morally required to be—targeted at disadvantage-causing
social change. Any social reengineering that the disability rights lobby desires could be
subsidized by private charity and still comport with libertarian principles. Depending on
the moral sensibilities of individual donors, the social model of disability might even
make such objectives more appealing. To be sure, members of the disability rights
movement are likely to find reference to “charity” dangerously associated with
stereotypes about helplessness and inferiority. This discussion is not interested in
following the movement, however. It is an investigation of possible logical connections
between general normative frameworks and the social model.
Exactly how libertarianism ought to respond to disability rights claims and the
social model is not well understood. Two points are worth underscoring. First, a coherent
libertarian theory might well deny any government policy to assist the disadvantaged in
general and the disabled in particular. Adherents of such theory could then accept the
social model without committing to social change, at least not through public policy.
Second and in contrast, different versions of libertarianism might be triggered by the
social model. The interconnection worth exploring is corrective justice, along with the
possibility that individual charitable choices will be directed at social reengineering.
Much more certain is the perspective from which these judgments must be made.
It is inadequate for disability rights advocates to demand either resources or
environmental revision simply because it will improve the status of disabled people. In
accord with its character, a general normative framework—libertarian or otherwise—
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must be able to process countless demands for change. These frameworks sacrifice
precision and sometimes sophistication in exchange for their general applicability. Yet
they prompt an inclusive orientation toward the range of issues faced by a complex
society with a multitude of competing visions. Unfiltered parochialism of a social
movement, however satisfying for adherents, cannot fare well within these theories.
2.

Utilitarian

Utilitarianism is a type of consequentialist theory that assesses the morality of
conduct by the effect it has on the total or average utility of the relevant community.141 In
its common forms, the theory includes three separable commitments: judging actions
according to the state of affairs they produce (consequentialism), judging states of affairs
by information regarding utility (welfarism), and adding together individuals’ utility to
calculate social welfare (sum-ranking).142 Utility can be defined in more than one way, of
course.143 Bentham’s hedonic utilitarianism is pegged to mental states of pleasure and
pain. Others count preference satisfaction as utility even if not accompanied by the
sensation of pleasure; this makes room for long-term designs, no-pain-no-gain exercise
enthusiasm, horror-film fanaticism, and masochism. Mill asserted that certain higher
pleasures made possible by human faculties could be judged superior in kind by those
with experience; perhaps uninformed preferences should be less valued. And Harsanyi
refused to count antisocial preferences such as sadism, envy, or malice.144 These
divisions within utilitarianism are important but they should not greatly affect the
relationship to the social model. The general message is plain enough: pay attention to
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See John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism 8 (Longmans, Green 1897); Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of
Ethics 379-85 (1877); Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation 1-7,
24-69 (Oxford 1781). See also Robert E. Goodin, Utilitarianism as a Public Philosophy 4 (Cambridge
1995) (suggesting utilitarianism is a better guide to public policy than personal conduct); J.J.C. Smart, An
Outline of a System of Utilitarian Ethics, in Utilitarianism: For and Against 3, 27-28 (1973) (noting the
average versus total utility problem).
142
A critical review that draws these distinctions is Amartya Sen and Bernard Williams, Introduction, in
Amartya Sen and Bernard Williams, eds, Utilitarianism and Beyond 1, 3-5 (Cambridge 1982). See also
Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare 27 (PUBLISHER 2002) (declining to take a
position on the third commitment). To be clear, I use utilitarianism to illustrate rather than to privilege it
over other kinds of welfarism.
143
A quick summary is Goodin, Utilitarianism as a Public Philosophy at 13-14 (cited in note 141).
144
John C. Harsanyi, Morality and the Theory of Rational Behaviour, in Utilitarianism at 39, 65 (cited in
note 142) (finding “a general goodwill and human sympathy” in utilitarianism).
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the consequences of every action for people’s utility and aim to maximize the sum total
of their utility.
An important element of the framework is the concept of marginal utility, and a
plausible assumption that it is sometimes inversely related to quantity.145 The same
increment of a useful resource might radically escalate the well-being of one person,
while doing almost nothing for another. Cash receipts provide a simple example. The
unemployed person living in poverty might value an additional $1,000 much more than a
billionaire. The ideal distribution of resources under utilitarianism, therefore, ought to
account for such differences and attempt to allocate resources such that marginal utility is
equalized. Thus the sort of coerced redistribution barred by libertarian theory might be
defended. Of course, government run welfare programs come with risks that utilitarians
must consider. Marginal utility rates can be difficult to ascertain and easy to fake.
Redistribution can affect incentives to engage in welfare-enhancing activities that, in
turn, dampen the need for redistribution in the first place. Plus there will be alternative
uses for resources that might produce even greater total welfare, including the possibility
that gains to the well-off [A1]will more than compensate for deprivations elsewhere.
Equally significant, however, is that utilitarianism opens the possibility of government
assistance to the disadvantaged in ways that libertarianism does not.146
Return to our central inquiries: whether utilitarianism suggests any policy
response to disability and, if so, whether that response is more likely to address individual
impairments or social environments. An answer to the first question depends on empirical
data and educated guesswork. Utilitarians should want to know whether a physical or
mental impairment increases marginal utility such that an additional unit of at least one
resource will increase the welfare of an impaired person more than otherwise, or more
than it would for alternative beneficiaries. The very label “impairment” might suggest the
answer is yes. But it could be that people adjust to challenging circumstances by
emotionally accepting their lot, or by focusing on the positive, or by setting a different
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The assumption is complicated by, for example, differing preferences, goods that cannot be
individuated, and goods which depend on other goods or opportunities for their value.
146
It is unclear whether utilitarianism must consider the well-being of future generations beyond the
preferences of today’s generation for the well-being of that future generation.
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baseline for judging new experiences;147 that they lead lives no less fulfilling than others
similarly situated; and that they would benefit no more than others from additional
resources. In fact, impairment might be seen as “character building” and indelibly
attached to identity. This is a sort of Triumph of the Human Spirit story for disability, and
it is related to the academic field of hedonic adaptation.148
As best we can tell, adaptation varies with impairment. Mark Stein offers a
potentially instructive division. He separates physical, emotional, and intellectual
impairments.149 First, as to physical impairments such as quadriplegia, respondents often
indicate lower happiness scores than control groups. The gap may close over time but not
always completely. Two prominent studies are summarized in Table 1 (which includes a
small sample of respondents whose spinal chord injuries took place within the year)150
and Table 2 (which has a larger sample and where the injuries occurred on average thirtyyears earlier).151 Second, different emotional problems appear to generate different
happiness outcomes. Depression is almost by definition unhappiness, while
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See G.G. Whiteneck, et al, Mortality, Morbidity, and Psychosocial Outcomes of Persons Spinal Cord
Injured More than 20 Years Ago, 30 Paraplegia 617, 628-29 (1992) (concluding that respondents rated the
importance of some goods higher and some lower than the general population).
148
See Shane Frederick and George Loewenstein, Hedonic Adaptation, in Daniel Kahneman, Ed Diener,
and Norbert Schwarz, eds, Well-Being: The Foundations of Hedonic Psychology 302, 312 (Russell Sage
1999) (reviewing studies on adaptation). For a literature review that emphasizes similarities in happiness
scores for impaired and unimpaired respondents, see Bagenstos and Schlanger, 60 Vand L Rev at _ (cited
in note 57). See also Daniel Gilbert, Stumbling on Happiness 103-04, 152-53 (2006).
149
See Stein, Distributive Justice at 25-32 (cited in note 119)
150
See Philip Brickman, Dan Coates and Ronnie Janoff-Bulman, Lottery Winners and Accident Victims:
Is Happiness Relative?, 36 J Personality & Soc Psych 917, 921 (1978). The data is cross-sectional so
happiness scores before the relevant event were based on retrospective estimates of respondents. The
control group was asked about their happiness six months ago on a scale of zero to five; the paraplegic and
quadriplegic respondents became impaired one to twelve months before the survey and were full-time
patients in a rehabilitation institute; the lottery winners won $50,000-$1,000,000 within 1.5 years of the
survey. See id at 918-20. The authors found statistically significant differences in present and past
happiness reports from the control group as opposed to the paraplegic and quadriplegic respondents. See id
at 920-21.
151
See Richard Schulz and Susan Decker, Long-Term Adjustment to Physical Disability: The Role of
Social Support, Perceived Control, and Self-Blame, 48 J Personality & Soc Psych 1162, 1167 (1985). The
data is cross-sectional. Respondents were 100 paraplegics and quadriplegics living in noninstitutional
settings. Their sample was over age forty, 90% male, and the average time since injury was more than
thirty years. See id at 1163-64. Three surveys designed to test psychological well-being were administered
to the sample and compared to more general population responses reported in other studies. See id at 116668. Only one of the comparisons is displayed in the table below but the other two are similar. Higher scores
indicate higher life satisfaction on a scale of zero to eighteen, measured by multiple questions. See id at
1167. Statistical significance is not estimated by the authors in this study.
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schizophrenics will not necessarily report significantly lower happiness scores.152 Third,
intellectual impairments might not be associated with any reduction in happiness.153 A
person can have a low IQ score and be equally content with life as the median
respondent. Finally, Shane Frederick and George Loewenstein report that “[t]here is less
evidence of adaptation to chronic or progressive diseases such as chronic rheumatoid
arthritis, multiple sclerosis, and other degenerative disorders.”154

Table 1: A Short-Term Self-Reported Happiness Study
Retrospective Report of Happiness Before

Happiness Now

5.00
4.41
4.00
3.77

4.00

3.82
3.32

3.00

2.96

2.00
1.00
0.00
Lottery winners
(n=22)

Control group (n=22)

Paraplegics &
quadraplegics, 1-12
months since injury
(n=11 & 18)

152

See Stein, Distributive Justice at 30 (cited in note 119) (citing H.T. Koivumaa-Honkanen, et al,
Correlates of Life Satisfaction Among Psychiatric Patients, 94 Acta Psychiatrica Scandinavica 372, 376
(1996)).
153
See id at 31; A. Verri, et al, An Italian-Australian Comparison of Quality of Life among People with
Intellectual Disability Living in the Community, 43 J Intellectual Disability Research 513, 518-21 & tbl.4
(1999) (noting difficulties in scoring for those with cognitive impairments).
154
Frederick and Loewenstein, Hedonic Adaptation at 312 (cited in note 148) (citations omitted).
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T able 2: A Long-Term Self-Reported Happiness Study
(based on Mean Life Satisfaction Index-A scores)

18.0
15.0
13.4
12.0

12.2
10.8

9.0
6.0
3.0
0.0
Aged 18-64

Aged 65+

Paraplegics &
quadraplegics,
averaging 30 years
since injury (n=100)

Consumers of the adaptation literature must treat it with care.155 The studies can
be weakened by problems including scale norming, politically correct responses (“I’m
fine; how are you?”), lack of control for important variables, use of cross-sectional as
opposed to longitudinal or panel data, and—critically for utilitarians—failure to measure
marginal utility. If there is an uncomplicated message in this research, it is that
impairments do not entail misery, that people are often able to adapt to them at least
partly, and that others might underestimate those possibilities; but that relatively lower
happiness scores are correlated with certain forms of impairment.156 Because adaptation
can be incomplete, and impairment might well be associated with increased marginal
utility rates, utilitarianism could have room for a policy to improve the situation of
impaired people. Equally important, third-party effects should be considered. One reason
155

Some of the methodological problems are explained in id at 307-11.
See also Andrew J. Oswald and Nattavudh Powdthavee, Does Happiness Adapt? A Longitudinal Study
of Disability with Implications for Economists and Judges 6-15 (IZA Discussion Paper No 2208, 2006),
online at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=921040 (visited March 31, 2007) (using
British panel data and regressions to suggest some, but not complete, recovery in life satisfaction (LS)
scores over time among respondents who became disabled and noting lower average pre-disability LS
scores for those who became disabled); C. Lundqvist, et al, Spinal Cord Injuries: Clinical, Functional, and
Emotional Status, 16 Spine 78, 81-82 & fig. 1 (1991) (finding lower quality of life scores for a group of
Swedish tetraplegics, but less so after four years of injury); Thomas Mehnert, et al, Correlates of Life
Satisfaction in Those with Disabling Conditions, 35 Rehabilitation Psych 3, 4, 9-11 & tbl 2, 13 & tbl 3
(1990) (reporting higher LS scores for those with sensory impairments and less life-limiting impairments
than for other physical impairments, and even higher LS scores for nondisabled people)a. One of the first
and least sophisticated studies is Paul Cameron, et al, The Life Satisfaction of Nonnormal Persons, 41 J
Consulting & Clinical Psych 207, 207-11 (1973) (finding little difference in LS scores between controls
and an amalgamated class of respondents who were paralyzed, blind, hearing impaired, had a “deformed
limb,” etc.).
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impaired people might return to the median happiness level is that costly services are
being provided by family and friends, and because of this care provision their marginal
utility for resources may rise. Friends, family, and coworkers might suffer nonfinancial
welfare losses, too,157 even if the “victim” is not so badly off. So perhaps there is a prima
facie case for a utilitarian disability policy, with respect to at least certain classes of
impairments.158
The second inquiry is about the form of any utilitarian policy response. Does the
social model have any influence? One possibility is that people actually prefer to devote
scarce resources to remedying disabling social settings that were, in their judgment,
unjustly designed. And it is possible that this preference is stronger than any impulse to
“fix” impairments that contribute to such disabilities. All of this is partly speculation, yet
one would think utilitarianism must incorporate such preferences into its social welfare
calculations. The analysis of libertarian corrective justice then carries over into the
utilitarian policy analysis.
Setting aside this possibility, a utilitarian might investigate the source of welfare
losses and the cost-efficient response. These might be personal, social, or both. For some
individuals, pain and depression will dominate any loss of well-being connected to
impairment, and utilitarianism might then suggest subsidies for medical palliatives.159 For
others, medical costs might be the least of their troubles. A class of impaired people
might readily adapt to unusual personal traits but for social responses thereto. Social
isolation, or ridicule, or patronizing assumptions of unequal human value surely can be
sources of welfare loss. The same is true of various access barriers, from architectural to
economic.160 In addition, if the applicable version of utilitarianism bars consideration of

157

See Elizabeth F. Emens, The Sympathetic Discriminator: Mental Illness, Hedonic Costs, and the ADA,
94 Georgetown L J 399, 428-39 (2006) (collecting and analyzing studies).
158
See David A. Weisbach, A Welfarist Approach to Disabilities 13 (unpublished manuscript, 2007) (on
file with author) (noting difficulty in ascertaining marginal utility rates).
159
Bentham thought “bodily imperfection” tends to reduce the effect of pleasurable circumstances, while
at the same time “increas[ing] that of any afflictive one.” Bentham, An Introduction at 47 (cited in note
141). But he seems to have been guessing.
160
See Schulz and Decker, 48 J Personality & Soc Psych at 1170 (cited in note 151) (statistically
connecting the well-being of paraplegic and quadriplegic respondents to social support, social networks,
and a sense of control); I. Ville, J.-F. Ravaud, and Tetafigap Group, Subjective Well-Being and Severe
Motor Impairments: The Tetrafigap Survey on the Long-Term Outcome of Tetraplegic Spinal Cord Injured
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sadistic or uninformed preferences, then defenses for the environmental status quo
become weaker. Such preferences are one factor in perpetuating disadvantage, although
their relative significance may be debated. In any event the proper utilitarian policy might
be social reengineering—depending on the relative costs and benefits.
“Might” is a serious qualifier. Critical issues remain open. One pragmatic concern
is that improving the well-being of disabled people cannot be effectively or efficiently
achieved by the state. Actually disabled people must be differentiated from
malingerers.161 Even if the government can accomplish this at a tolerable cost, state
action must be compared with private ordering and alternative uses of resources.
Especially insofar as welfare losses can be alleviated by individualized medical care,
private insurance offers a partial solution. To the extent private action is inadequate, the
utilitarian will consider how much good can be done at the same cost but directed at other
goals. This is yet another empirical question about marginal utility. Given a limited
budget, the utilitarian will demand information (at a reasonable cost) regarding the
alternatives. Sometimes a relatively inexpensive environmental fix will produce major
welfare gains for impaired people and others. Curb cuts are an example: at least for new
construction, they cost little in the short run and they benefit wheelchair users, stroller
pushers, and skateboard riders over the long run. On other occasions, personalized
medical care will be the utility maximizing option, even if the beneficiaries prefer other
remedies. In yet other circumstances, resources will be better spent on softening the
burdens of poverty or some other societal problem for which the marginal gains per unit
of effort are greater.
The appropriate utilitarian response to congenital deafness is probably closest to
the latter circumstance. If the claims of Deaf culture members are accurate, there is
almost no deafness disability warranting a remedy. Once ASL skills are acquired, deaf
people may plug into a vibrant culture of language, art, literature, and other visual values.

Persons, 52 Soc Sci & Med 369, 379-82 (2001) (reporting a mixture of sources of diminished well-being
including pain, a sense of dependence, and inhibited social participation).
161
See Weisbach, A Welfarist Approach at 40-43 (cited in note 158) (posing solutions, such as in-kind
benefits, commodity subsidies, and accommodations that are more attractive to only disabled people). This
opacity problem is not peculiar to impairment or disability; marginal utility is often difficult to observe and
verify.
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There could be a place for antidiscrimination laws, however, depending on their
prospects for success. Deaf people, like other minority groups, can suffer from
stereotypical assumptions and invidious discrimination. It is also possible that subsidies
for cochlear implants and genetic screening can be justified to utilitarian satisfaction.
However happy deaf people come to be, the vast majority of society uses the spoken
word as part of its communications repertoire. Adjusting to this environment requires
effort, especially when a deaf child is born to hearing parents. A utilitarian might take
this as cause for policies that reduce the number of children born deaf.162
Such responses have at best a tenuous relationship to the social model of
disability. The assistance would be for personalized medical services and we have not
assumed the justification is a mass preference for corrective justice. Without that
assumption, state-led changes in the environment seem unlikely. On an implausible
factual showing, the Laurent development effort might be entitled to subsidy. On a more
likely foundation, utilitarians might support expenditures for ASL training and Gallaudet.
But not every American would be taught ASL in order to benefit so few. Other physical
and mental impairments might be treated very differently by the utilitarian state. For
deafness, however, a claim to large-scale social change seems weak.
Disability rights advocates might reject the utilitarian framework altogether.163
But their worst fears are misplaced. Unlike libertarianism, nothing about utilitarianism
inherently disfavors state-orchestrated assistance to the disadvantaged. It could be that
coerced wealth transfers to disabled people would benefit them more than the transfer
would hurt donors and their incentives going forward. It could be that social
reengineering generates even greater welfare gains, depending on the particulars,
timeframe, and discount rate. Or the opposite could be true. The upshot is that the social
model is relevant to utilitarianism, albeit in a different and possibly more significant way
than it is to libertarianism. The social model can identify root causes of disadvantage,
162

Moral outrage at any of these policy positions, it would seem, must be considered by utilitarians when
calculating whether the policy helps maximize welfare.
163
See Barnes, Theories of Disability at 50, 56 (cited in note 25) (linking liberal utilitarianism to minority
oppression and infanticide); Pfeiffer, The Conceptualization of Disability at 41-42 (cited in note 19)
(“[C]ivil rights are NOT dependent on available funding or even the appropriation of funds.”) (citations
omitted).
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which might seriously reduce an impaired individual’s well-being and be alleviated
efficiently by state action.
3.

Egalitarian

Libertarianism yielded some but not much responsiveness to the social model,
while utilitarianism suggested additional sensitivity without anything like a firm
commitment to environmental engineering. In fact, both frameworks will produce no
public policy responses to disability in a variety of situations. Egalitarian theories might
do more in that they stress particular forms of equality over, or in addition to, individual
liberty and social welfare. Egalitarian theories are diverse in content,164 and so this
subsection will follow the pattern above by stylizing the framework and then
concentrating on the questions of policy response and its target.165
Egalitarian normative frameworks speak to distributive justice. These claims are
usually about results, and contemporary theories are often unwilling to validate
distributions produced within a system of largely private ordering. But there is
disagreement regarding which valuable assets should be the subject of distributive
concern and what qualifies as a just distribution. Egalitarian interest certainly includes
economic resources, yet nonmaterial assets such as health care and genetic engineering
opportunities have been the subject of concern.166 Moreover, the claim to a given
distribution could be based on different commitments, even if equal human dignity and
entitlement to respect is accepted as the starting point. The concepts of equality and
equitable distribution are essentially empty without further argument; recall the
murderer’s disadvantageous situation in statement 1, above.167
Identifying a comfortable motivation for resource distribution might take three
routes. One is procedural, the second returns to corrective justice, and the third is directly
164

See Samuel Fleischacker, A Short History of Distributive Justice 9-10 (Harvard 2004).
Egalitarianism is hardly new to disability scholarship, as evidenced by the civil rights model of
disability policy. See, for example, Hahn, 4 S Cal Rev L & Women’s Studies at 98-99 (cited in note 54).
166
See, for example, Daniels, Just Health Care at 23-27, 36-58 (cited in note 44) (connecting health care
necessary to “species-typical normal functioning” with opportunities for life plans); Fleischacker, A Short
History at 122-23 (cited in note 164) (citing Allen Buchanan, et al, From Chance to Choice: Genetics and
Justice (Cambridge 2000) for the idea that distributive justice may apply to genetic engineering).
167
Part II.C. See also Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 Harv L Rev 537, 547 (1982)
(“[T]reatments can be alike only in reference to some moral rule.”).
165
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concerned with outcomes. The procedural route is exemplified by John Rawls. He asks us
to picture an initial position in which parties deliberating about basic principles and
institutions are stripped of knowledge about their position in life after the negotiation is
over and are roughly equal in their ability to negotiate. Rawls draws certain conclusions
about the outcome of this hypothetical negotiation process, including the controversial
assertion that economic inequalities would be tolerated only under narrow conditions.168
There are ongoing debates regarding these conclusions and Rawls’s decision to exclude
severely impaired people from the hypothetical parties in his original position.169 These
controversies will be ignored here. Assessing the propriety of Rawls’s analytical devices
is not essential for reaching conclusions about the social model’s connection to
egalitarian normative frameworks. That Rawls suggests a spirit of equality that might
encompass assistance for physically and mentally impaired people is of some interest, but
more intellectual mileage can be traveled with less effort by shifting attention to more
overtly outcome-based theory.
A second division of egalitarian theorizing might borrow from ideas of corrective
justice. This option stands between procedural and purely outcome based theories. The
argument is that identifiable classes of people have been treated unjustly, they are at a
relative disadvantage for no reason now thought acceptable, and the situation ought to be
corrected. This claim was discussed above and those remarks carry over here. It is worth
repeating that traditional corrective justice arguments do not fit perfectly with groupsuffered and group-imposed injustices over extended time periods. In addition, the claim
probably will be unavailable to some disabled groups—and yet helpful to even the most
well-off members of historically disadvantaged groups (think about physically impaired
law professors who write about disability law). Finally, the remedy will not necessarily
be social restructuring.

168

See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 76 (Harvard 1999). See also Ronald Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue:
The Theory and Practice of Equality 66-83, 331-50 (Harvard 2000) (attempting to distinguish loss
following calculated gambles from brute bad luck, and suggesting resource transfers to respond to the latter
but not the former).
169
See John Rawls, Political Liberalism 183-85 (1993); John Rawls, Kantian Constructivism in Moral
Theory, 77 J Phil 515, 546 (1980) (assuming “everyone has sufficient intellectual powers to play a normal
part in society, and no one suffers from unusual needs”).
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This leaves a third possibility: grounding egalitarianism claims for distributive
justice primarily on outcomes. In this space, two prominent subdivisions can be
described. The first concentrates on the problem of group subordination or caste.170 Antisubordination claims are commonly fueled with corrective justice-like histories, along the
lines of racial discrimination. But this is not necessary. It could be morally intolerable for
a group of people to be systematically disadvantaged in socioeconomic well-being and
political power simply out of respect for their dignity, and even aside from pragmatic
interests in social cohesion and order.171 The cause might be a negligent political process
failure, illiberal hatred, bad luck, or something else. An extension of this thought is to
require honest interrogation of the justifications for subordination. A moral theory might
demand an explanation for the outcome that we can now accept as rational and
persuasive. Either way, anti-subordination theories do not turn on aggregate welfare
maximization; the suffering of a subordinated group (at least presumptively) cannot be
offset by the welfare gains of the winners. Additionally, anti-subordination arguments
might cover greater range than the most generous versions of corrective justice. Of course
there are complications and doubts to be raised. The theory calls for a method of
recognizing relevant groups, for one thing, and it relies on a conception of rationality or
persuasiveness that might be contested. Nevertheless, anti-subordination is an outcomeoriented alternative to libertarianism and utilitarianism in their simple forms.
A second outcome-based alternative involves human capabilities. Associated with
Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum,172 it resembles Rawls’s notion of primary goods.173
170

See Sunstein, The Partial Constitution at 339-44 (cited in note 103) (stressing morally irrelevant
differences and disadvantage on multiple dimensions of welfare); Iris Marion Young, Justice and the
Politics of Difference 32-38 (Princeton 1990) (discussing oppression and domination); Catharine A.
MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified: Discourses on Life and Law 36-37 (Harvard 1987); Cass R. Sunstein,
The Anticaste Principle, 92 Mich L Rev 2410, 2411 (1994); Alan David Freeman, Legitimizing Racial
Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 Minn
L Rev 1049, 1053-54, 1061-63 (1978); Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 Phil &
Pub Affairs 107, 148-52 (1976) (concentrating on the threat of deep and persistent socioeconomic and
political subordination, without depending on claims of past discrimination or compensation). For a review
and critique focusing on race, see Andrew Koppelman, Antidiscrimination Law and Social Equality 76-99
(Yale 1996).
171
See Fiss, 5 Phil & Pub Affairs at 151 (cited in note 170).
172
See Martha C. Nussbaum, Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach 4-6
(Cambridge 2000); Amartya Sen, Inequality Reexamined 39-55 (Harvard 1992). See also Martha C.
Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species Membership ch 3 (Harvard 2006); Martha
C. Nussbaum, Capabilities as Fundamental Entitlements: Sen and Social Justice, in Alexander Kaufman,
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The theory commits to the development of capabilities (opportunities to achieve certain
functionings) that make possible a good human life, rather than the actual achievement of
any particular function.174 People may choose whether to exercise these opportunities.
But everyone must have these opportunities before a social system is minimally just;175
there is no set-off for the well-being of the more fortunate. The theory also requires
attention to individual differences. People are diverse in their goals, values, biology, and
other attributes, and they interact within distinct social settings. This can make
standardized packages of consumption goods hard to defend as the measure of well-being
without accounting for health, self-respect, political participation, and so on.176 At the
same time, modesty is inherent in versions of the theory that seek a minimum threshold
level of opportunity across a limited list of capabilities.177 This suggests theoretical
humility, by setting aside many issues of distributive justice and allowing evolution over
time. It offers the possibility of overlapping consensus, by drafting a minimalist
capabilities set that might be agreeable from several normative perspectives. And it
implicitly prioritizes the use of scarce resources, by identifying projects worthy of
immediate attention. Finally, the capabilities approach disregards adaptive preferences

ed, Capabilities Equality: Basic Issues and Problems 44, 46-47, 54-57, 66-67 (Routledge 2006) (exploring
distinctions with Sen); Elizabeth S. Anderson, What Is the Point of Equality?, 109 Ethics 287, 317-18, 334
(1999) (stating that democratic equality provides for the capabilities necessary to function as a citizen). For
some egalitarian caution, see David Wasserman, Disability, Capability, and Thresholds for Distributive
Justice, in Kaufman, Capabilities Equality 214, 215; Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue at 303 (cited in note 168)
(“[T]he equality we seek is in personal and impersonal resources themselves, not in people’s capacities to
achieve welfare or well-being with those resources.”).
173
See Rawls, A Theory of Justice at 63-64, 90-95 (cited in note 169) (including the social basis of selfrespect).
174
But see Nussbaum, Frontiers at 172-73 (cited in note 172) (excepting dignity, children, and those with
severe mental impairments, where actual functioning is the goal).
175
See Nussbaum, Women at 71 (cited in note 172); Sen, Inequality Reexamined at 39 (cited in note
172).
176
See Sen, Inequality Reexamined at 31 (cited in note 172); Amartya Sen, Equality of What? 217
(Tanner Lectures on Human Values, May 1979), online at
http://www.tannerlectures.utah.edu/lectures/sen80.pdf (visited Mar 31, 2007).
177
See Nussbaum, Women at 78-82 (cited in note 172) (stressing practical reason and affiliation, along
with a life of normal length, adequate bodily health, nourishment and shelter, bodily integrity, senses and
thinking, emotion, living with other species, play, and control over political and material environment);
Sen, Inequality Reexamined at 39-40, 44-45 & n 19 (cited in note 172) (listing adequate nourishment and
shelter, good health, avoidance of escapable morbidity and premature mortality, happiness, self respect, and
participating in community). See also id at 49-53 (explaining that capability to achieve functionings itself
might be a component of well-being). Sen distinguishes “agency freedom” as the ability to realize
objectives not so directly related to that person’s individual well-being, such as national independence. Sen,
Inequality Reexamined at 56-57 (cited in note 172).
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judged unworthy of respect. The theory will not honor aspirations moderated in the face
of unjustly oppressive circumstances, however defined.178 This account leaves open many
questions, such as the precise list of capabilities that must be guaranteed along with
inevitable implementation issues. But the basic idea is clear enough.
On these elaborations and at first look, egalitarianism seems perfectly suited to
certain disability rights claims. It is all about rectifying disadvantage. Such theories
therefore point toward the opportunity for disabled people to claim a policy response to
their disadvantage (even if their claims are not categorically different from others). Not
every disabled person will fit the conditions for assistance under anti-subordination or
capabilities approaches. But surely some will. A far more challenging problem is the
relevance, if any, of the social model. Does one need to understand that impairmentrelated disadvantage can be the result of social settings?
From one angle, the answer is no. Anti-subordination and capabilities theories are
triggered by severe group disadvantage and individual lack of minimum opportunities,
respectively. On the face of it, an entitlement to assistance is unrelated to a history of
socially imposed oppression or even a contemporary social cause of this individual’s or
this group’s particular disadvantage. An impaired person’s situation might be attributed
to his personal traits or to some unknown cause and these egalitarian theories would
apply nonetheless. To be sure, one must comprehend the social structure to test whether a
group is subordinated; that condition is relational. Likewise, certain human capabilities
are joined to social circumstance, such as the opportunity to affiliate with other human
beings. Yet to be precise about the matter, the social model’s attempt to locate social
factors in disadvantage does not seem required. For these theories and at this level of
abstraction, it is the resulting disadvantage, rather than its etiology, that matters.
An only slightly deeper review of these theories, however, exposes connections to
the social model. With respect to anti-subordination, justifications for disadvantage are
important. Policymakers cannot hope to assess condemnations and defenses of
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See Sen, Inequality Reexamined at 55 (cited in note 172); Nussbaum, Women at 136-43 (cited in note
172). On the problem of adaptive preferences, see Jon Elster, Sour Grapes: Studies in the Subversion of
Rationality ch 3 (1983), and Cass R. Sunstein, Free Markets and Social Justice 25-30 (1997).
Draft of April 22, 2007

58

disadvantage without understanding the causal factors. The social model speaks to this
inquiry. With respect to both theories, there is the issue of adaptive preferences. Neither
approach is willing to abide by preferences that are the product of unjust conditions. This
is a delicate inquiry, of course, because both theories aim to promote human freedom.
Understanding these unjust conditions accurately is therefore critical. A social model of
disability fits here, as well. Its application reveals multiple sources of disadvantage,
which will assist the egalitarian in understanding whether the stated preferences of
impaired people ought to be reflected in public policy or overridden in favor of other
objectives. Beyond this, the social model’s nexus with egalitarianism is more
complicated.
The most significant remaining issue is about policy form: whether antisubordination and capabilities theories make use of the social model in designing
remedies. The answer is a qualified “yes.” As to capabilities, there clearly is an
environmental component to several candidates for the list, perhaps all of them.
Associative opportunities and the power to affect the surrounding material environment
are good examples.179 Capabilities theorists understand that adverse social settings can
prevent individuals from realizing core freedom.180 Moreover, all of these capabilities
must be afforded to every member of society before a rudimentary measure of social
justice is achieved. For at least some impaired people, then, socially dependent
capabilities must be enjoyed regardless of other opportunities and this can depend on
environmental change. Similar thoughts apply to subordination remedies. If the
subordinated status of a group sharing a physical trait like deformity is the product of
irrationally imposed social stigma, then one would think the social dynamic needs to be
corrected without “fixing” the subject of disadvantage. So surely there are conditions
under which an egalitarian will strongly prefer social reengineering over personalized
services.

179

See Nussbaum, Women at 84-85 (cited in note 172) (defining “combined capabilities”).
See id at 84-86; Nussbaum, Frontiers at 167-68, 221-22 (cited in note 172) (discussing wheelchairs
and noting hierarchy and stigma dynamics). Compare Nussbaum, Frontiers at 169-70 (cited in note 172)
(remarking on the importance of individualized care for mentally impaired people).
180

Draft of April 22, 2007

59

Yet there is a fair question as to exactly what these conditions are. It does not
seem inherent within either anti-subordination or capabilities theories to systematically
bias policy in favor of social change if there is a feasible alternative remedy directed at
the victim of disadvantage. Of course, a capabilities proponent is not going to sacrifice
the bodily integrity of impaired people and force them into corrective surgery, as long as
they are exercising practical reason and not following discardable adaptive preferences.
But what about closer cases? The answer is not apparent. This seems especially true of
the capabilities approach. Part of its inspiration is practical: however distributionally
unjust the present world, limited resources is a brute fact. Now suppose that a medical
service will alleviate the relevant disadvantage to the same degree as some type of
environmental restructuring, but the cost of the latter vastly outruns the cost of the
former. What now?
The problem can be made more concrete with a final return to the controversies of
Deaf culture. The average deaf person might not meet the test of subordination, yet it is
possible that many are left without adequate capabilities or must bear too great a sacrifice
in meeting those minimum levels. This might be implausible for this particular disability,
but for the sake of argument assume that a capabilities theory is applicable. The public
policy response might be directed at reducing or eliminating deafness through medicine
and technology. Cochlear implants and genetic screening could be subsidized, or even
mandated. In the alternative or in addition, the state might support environments in which
lack of hearing is not disabling. Gallaudet University and other sign language
communities are the models, but more could be accomplished including widespread
instruction in ASL. Egalitarian theorists might consider it perverse for the state to rectify
disadvantage with a medical device mandate. Even with this course off the agenda, we
are left with a range of options, including subsidies instead of penalties. And the
comparative cost analysis might be little different from utilitarianism.
This might not have been anticipated. An important strand of egalitarianism, a
framework designed for the type of disadvantage located by the social model, might not
have much use for the social model. To be sure, there is more than one brand of
egalitarianism. Some will be more attentive to remedial social costs than others. Some
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might be worked out logically to privilege environmental restructuring over personal care
directed to individuals who are at serious disadvantage attributable to the animus,
disregard, or irrationality of society at large. And there might be forward-looking
consequences that support social change. For now, however, it is enough to recognize
that the social model of disability influences very little of the normative analysis, and
only then as a consequence of the chosen normative framework.
C.

Institutional Design and Expertise
[T]he so called “experts” suffer a poverty of thinking.181
The foregoing has struggled against the potential normative implications of the

social model. Before closing, a different conclusion can be reached with respect to
remedies for disadvantage. This is the practical issue of institutional choice and design.
Now, even here normative premises drive the analysis and, to reiterate, identifying causes
of disadvantage is not the same as finding sensible solutions. There can be a significant
distance between the two, perhaps especially as time passes. But after social causes
become relevant to policy on some moral theory, a special set of decision-makers might
be needed. This mediated, institutional-expertise implication of the social model seems to
have been overlooked.
Much legal and philosophical inquiry involves goal choices and nobody doubts
their importance. But goals are nearly useless absent a feasible strategy for their
accomplishment. Selections must be made among available institutions and among
possible designs within those institutions.182 Once we move beyond the admittedly
formidable question of normative objective, the institutional issues begin to crystallize.
Institutional and goal problems play off each other but they are to a degree discrete. And
sometimes the mechanics of institutional analysis are less daunting than the struggle of
overtly normative debate.
Assume, then, that the correct general normative framework yields social change
as the goal. Personalized medical services are rejected as the solution to disadvantage.
181

UPIAS Commentary at 16 (cited in note 1) (referring to charity efforts).
On institutional choice and design generally, see David L. Weimer, Institutional Design: Overview, in
David L. Weimer, ed, Institutional Design 1, 12 (Kluwer Academic 1995), and Neil K. Komesar, Imperfect
Alternatives: Choosing Institutions in Law, Economics, and Public Policy 5 (Chicago 1994).
182
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We might also assume that the social model of disability helped make that selection,
although this is not strictly necessary to the analysis. Perhaps the best specification of
corrective justice was triggered by the social model’s account of causation for some
particular disabled group. The social cause of disadvantage turned out to be unjustly
imposed and it now must be corrected in an effective and efficient manner. These
parameters dictate the choice of institution and its design for the implementation of
disability policy. And now the social model of disability seems relevant.
Compare the sensible institutional design choices when social and environmental
change is necessary, as opposed to personalized medical and technological services. The
relevant expertise will sometimes be very different. While economic cost considerations
might call for a similar set of accounting skills, and medical knowledge is surely relevant
to nearly any public policy involving physical and mental traits, social and environmental
reengineering depend on additional skills if the policy mission is to be successful. If
government will subsidize cochlear implants or genetic screening, doctors and medical
technicians along with economists will be useful. But if government intends to
manufacture social settings in which deafness and other impairments are not socially
disadvantageous, the policymakers and executors ought to be a more diverse group if not
simply different. Now sociologists, architects, political scientists, social psychologists,
anthropologists, historians, and others with unique skill sets become more valuable.
Understanding disadvantageous environments, whether built or the product of social
interaction, can be a matter of uncommon knowledge. Physicians, however, might be the
last people asked for their opinion. Whatever their lack, the developers of Laurent, South
Dakota were not in need of medical advice.
In an important respect, this is an outcome hoped for by the disability rights
community from the start, albeit through a different analytical route. An early motivation
for the movement was the sense that medical experts and government welfare officials
were dictating important life choices for disabled people.183 More important, their
mission and skills were not tailored to liberating social change. Once a commitment to

183

See Part III.A.2.
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environmental reengineering is made, that set of decision-makers loses its authority. One
might then consider the social movement vindicated.
Still, the analysis above does not necessarily move disabled people from the status
of “sick role” to the masters of public policy. Disabled people will quite probably rest
somewhere in between. This group has demonstrated its ability to communicate the
problems of disadvantage and the possibilities of social change (sometimes rather trivial
change) that can escalate their opportunities for a rewarding life. That information is
indispensable to sensible institutional choice and design. One should not immediately
reach the further conclusion, however, that the knowledge and preferences of disabled
people must supersede other expertise and competing policy considerations. But these are
issues at the margins. The important finding is that the social model can influence
institutional choices by shifting the demand for expertise, although only in conjunction
with the right normative framework.
CONCLUSION
The social model of disability is not a justification for any policy goal. A causal
account of disadvantage, however insightful, is no substitute for norms. That the contrary
is often taken for granted reflects the character of disability legal studies, which is partly
an outgrowth of the disability rights social movement. I make no claim that social
movement membership is shallow or less enlightening than operating within abstract
moral theory. At some point, however, disability rights proponents might choose to
confront more effectively the problems of limited resources and competing claims of
justice. Devotion to elevating the status of a single interest group is not conducive to that
task.
Egalitarian, utilitarian, and libertarian frameworks offer relatively sweeping
methods of analysis. Certain specifications of these frameworks show responsiveness to
the social model’s identification of environmental factors in the production of
disadvantage. Those causal factors are real. They are often ignored. And the social model
is a revelatory corrective. The model thus has the potential to knock out ill-considered
defenses of the status quo based on nature and necessity, just as legal realism and other
reform advocacy attempted to unsettle assumptions in the past. But justifying change
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takes more. It would be tragic, in an utterly uncondescending meaning of the word, if
disability scholarship is marginalized by its own unreflective reliance on an otherwise
valuable intellectual contribution of the movement.

Readers with comments may address them to:
Professor Adam M. Samaha
University of Chicago Law School
1111 East 60th Street
Chicago, IL 60637
asamaha@uclaw.uchicago.edu
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